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This is a good example of how the market can outperform centralized governing councils under certain conditions. the LEED-certifying body can't possibly hope t
by kcorbitt 13y ago
This is a good example of how the market can outperform centralized governing councils under certain conditions.
the LEED-certifying body can't possibly hope to know all the 2nd- and 3rd-degree repercussions of different design decisions. But if we just increased the energy tax by 20% (arbitrary number), people would tend to find the global maxima of energy efficiency without having to conform to rigid standards.
The same thing can be seen with cars. I think that raising CAFE standards for gas mileage is great and all, but at least where I'm from the trend toward buying more efficient cars is less about their lower upfront cost as a result of CAFE-induced supply reduction and more about the rising price of gas. A $1.50/gallon federal "negative externalities" tax on gasoline would do wonders for the nation's energy consumption levels.
- mjn 13y agoLEED and CAFE are a bit different: CAFE is a set of government-mandated standards aimed at reducing pollution (whether effectively or not), while LEED is a set of standards that originate with a private-sector trade group, aimed at promoting the brand of "green" architecture (and it's done that quite effectively). I don't see it as distinct from the market: LEED is an example of the market at work. It's just that it's optimizing for what the market optimizes for by default (profits), not optimizing for the actual environment. That process, where the market treats environmentalist sensibilities as just another niche market to cater to, is sometimes referred to as "green marketing", or more derogatorily as "greenwashing".
- kcorbitt 13y agoSure, I'm not saying that LEED doesn't work because it's government-run (it's not) nor even going so far as saying that government involvement in the market is necessarily evil. I'm trying to make the distinction between an incentives-based market and a central planning council, not between the government and the private sector. The government can plan things centrally or organize distributed exchanges, as can private companies and trade organizations.
- vy8vWJlco 13y agoI get your point, but promoting a tax to get the most out of the market is doublespeak. A carrot ("This is better because... and you can use it!") is more "free-market" than a stick ("Don't do that.") - even if I would prefer not to be tempted (or threatened) by either.
- saraid216 13y agoIt's not an incentive or a threat; it's a change in the rules of the game. When they patch Starcraft to increase the damage that a spore crawler does to biological units, that's not an incentive or a threat; it's a change in the rules of the game.
- vy8vWJlco 13y agoI can't think of any rules that aren't enforced by threat. (The equivalent of patching Starcraft in the real world makes you rich or lands you in jail for tax evasion. The government's patch is only accepted because of the threat of force behind it.)
- anonymoushn 13y agoEven if we all believe taxation is theft, we can still talk about which taxes and which expenditures are better than others. Given the choice between the state coercing you using the threat of violence and the state coercing you using the threat of violence in such a way that some public good is achieved, it seems natural to prefer the latter.
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- saraid216 13y ago> The government's patch is only accepted because of the threat of force behind it. Uh, some of us accept the government's patch because we agree with it, or because we want to play the same game that everyone else is and the government happens to be a conveniently centralized entity for deciding which patches go in and which do not. Like Blizzard. We also accept that hacking your own patch in either means you can't play on the ladder with everyone else or that it's an action worth of receiving a ban in response. It's called "establishing a free market".
- cam_l 13y agoThe issue particular to buildings is, as opposed to manufactured goods etc, buildings tend to stick around for quite a while and cost a lot of money for the build and a lot of money to operate. More than that, large capital outlays are required to reduce the operating costs by marginal amounts over the life of the building. Whenever you have a substantial delay between the outlay and the payback, market forces tend to be ineffective. Also, if we are talking energy costs, something like half the energy costs in buildings are in embodied energy - in the steel and concrete and materials used to build it. A broad scale energy tax would encourage reduction of upfront energy usage at the expense of long term operation. Any at the same time, may trigger the demolition of existing stock. Add to that most - something like 60-70% - building stock in the US is between 20-70 years old. If we take the example of making more efficient cars which started in the 80's, where the average age is less than ten years, we might expect to see the market delivering some real gains in building efficiency in 100 years or so.. Like it not, sometimes inefficient rigid standards are all we have. The standards are there to account for deficiencies in client requirements (or knowledge). There may be much better mechanisms to do this - one which better targets both the technical and motivational factors in energy reduction. But at the end of the day in an uninformed and long delay market, a blunt market mechanism is not it.