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I thought they actually had given up a custom cryptosystem and went with OTR (for person to person chats)? Although only after a year or two of crying about ho
by rdl 13y ago
I thought they actually had given up a custom cryptosystem and went with OTR (for person to person chats)? Although only after a year or two of crying about how the community was meaning mean to CryptoCat, etc. and viewing every bug report as a personal attack.
The problem is there is no "mpOTR" for them to switch to for multiperson. I'd argue for SSL protected IRC (like, SILC) and some kind of transparent/tamper-evident server on an .onion as an interim measure, instead of a roll-your-own alternative.
- ams6110 13y agoGPG supports multi-recipient encryption.
- rdl 13y agoWithout perfect forward secrecy. I'd probably take perfect forward secrecy over not needing a trusted third party for the protest use case, although neither is ideal.
- tptacek 13y agoIt's easy to fetishize forward secrecy, but the reality is probably that forward secrecy is much more important in the context of TLS, where the lost of a single key might compromise billions of messages, than it is in the desktop case, where losing your key to an attacker also lost your keyboard inputs forever.
- rdl 13y agoOr in a scenario where seizure of a device is likely incident to arrest (i.e. your mobile phone), or where the key is stored online, or where your key is derived from a passphrase. Resistance to compelled disclosure (at least for historical stuff; they could still turn someone and force him to chat with people with an FBI agent watching over his shoulder...) is the benefit for PFS in the user to user case.