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Isn't the argument more that the people doing the software for end users shouldn't be implementing the cryptography for that software themselves and should inst
by jiggy2011 13y ago
Isn't the argument more that the people doing the software for end users shouldn't be implementing the cryptography for that software themselves and should instead built it on top of libraries that make all of the difficult decisions? Libraries like NACL are good for this, you don't specify cipher modes or anything like that you just say something closer to encrypt(data,key);
Of course you can still fuck up with just that, but it reduces the requirements for the programmer to understand deep cryptography and focus on designing their application for their users.
Also the advertised level of security will alter how the users use the software.
Say for example you have a bunch of confidential documents, you are currently storing them in a bomb proof safe and you never digitize them because you are concerned about security even though digital copies would be useful.
Along comes software that promises to be just as secure as your safe (or more secure). So you jump on it and start using it. Now if that software is not as secure as advertised then you are probably in a worse position security wise than you were before, and you don't even know until somebody steals your documents.