"actual state of affairs" !== "how the law is actually interpreted". "actual state of affairs" === "the true, objective metaethical status of law". > You're r

"actual state of affairs" !== "how the law is actually interpreted". "actual state of affairs" === "the true, objective metaethical status of law". > You're rather fond yourself of dismissing the opinions of the judiciary. Surely your opinions on the law are of even less account. I'm of the philosophical opinion that nobody's legal opinion really matters when it comes to metaethical truths. If we were comparing legal opinions, my opinions would probably be worthless. But I thought we were talking about philosophical opinions? If my philosophical opinions are wrong, they'll be wrong because of flaws in the structure of the theory, not simply because the judiciary or anybody else thinks otherwise. The distinction between legal validity and moral truth is one of the most important concepts in the philosophy of law. > I believe Kant did think that some kind of requirement to obey the law followed from the categorical imperative Yes, he did. I said so in my comment above. I suggest that you read other people's comments more carefully before trying to repeat what they already said. > since Kant does not agree with you on this specific issue ... what exactly is your point here? That Kant might have agreed with you if it wasn't for the fact that he didn't? If you'd read my comment above, you might have noticed that I specified exactly where I disagree with Kant. But it looks like you're just scanning for loose sentences to quibble about. > since there are lots of moral philosophers besides Kant Of course there are. Some of them agree with Kant, others don't. There are also a number of philosophers, such as R. P. Wolff and A. J. Simmons, who argue that there is no duty to obey the law just because it's the law. I'm inclined to agree with them.