4 ms·

It's analagous to media DRM. Nothing "works" if the user has admin access on the viewing device. And the only way to ensure that is a "trusted computing" chain

by jbert 13y ago

It's analagous to media DRM. Nothing "works" if the user has admin access on the viewing device. And the only way to ensure that is a "trusted computing" chain all the way from processor boot. Which is possible, but you have to lock out any viewers who can't demonstrate a secure chain from boot to viewing app (so you can trust the viewing app is "yours" rather than the device owners). And there's always the analog hole. Unless you can rely on a 'Eurion' (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EURion_constellation)-like http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EURion_constellation)-like mark to stop recording, people can always capture data at the point of display-to-retina. The only other approach is the after-the-fact blamethrower, where you tag each copy steganographically so that you know who was the original source of any leaked or circulated copies. That wouldn't stop a Snowden though.

jaekwon 13y ago
Yes, and probably the biggest hole is simply mod'ing the surveillance software with backdoor unauditable access to the data, such that higher ups with "special secret privileges" can bypass the logs. Who audits the software? etc.
whatusername 13y ago
Isn't the display-to-retina capture handled by physical security? Ie -- aren't most top-secret (not sure the exact classification but you know what I mean) facilities controlled in regards to what electronic equipment you can take inside?
- jbert 13y ago
  Yes, good point. But it all depends on level of risk, type and amount of data etc. You don't need any electronics for a film camera. Or any metal, for that matter. It's a risk to take such an item in, but maybe it's worth it for your use case. And I guess if it's small amounts of text, there's always human memory (or writing on your skin?). So you are (obviously I guess) trusting the people accessing the data to not abuse it, "helping" that trust with whatever technical countermeasures make it harder to move bulk data.

by jbert 13y ago

jaekwon 13y ago

Yes, and probably the biggest hole is simply mod'ing the surveillance software with backdoor unauditable access to the data, such that higher ups with "special secret privileges" can bypass the logs. Who audits the software? etc.

whatusername 13y ago

Isn't the display-to-retina capture handled by physical security? Ie -- aren't most top-secret (not sure the exact classification but you know what I mean) facilities controlled in regards to what electronic equipment you can take inside?

jbert 13y ago
Yes, good point. But it all depends on level of risk, type and amount of data etc. You don't need any electronics for a film camera. Or any metal, for that matter. It's a risk to take such an item in, but maybe it's worth it for your use case. And I guess if it's small amounts of text, there's always human memory (or writing on your skin?). So you are (obviously I guess) trusting the people accessing the data to not abuse it, "helping" that trust with whatever technical countermeasures make it harder to move bulk data.