2 ms·
I think Mike Masnick explained it pretty well why this is a pointless and stupid exercise: https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130627/22485123649/defense-depar
by mtgx 13y ago
I think Mike Masnick explained it pretty well why this is a pointless and stupid exercise:
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130627/22485123649/defense-department-blocks-all-web-access-to-guardian-response-to-nsa-leaks.shtml https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130627/22485123649/defen...
- vidarh 13y agoHe misses the point entirely. As much as I believe governments over-classify massively, and look on most leeks with glee: Consider that if an audit reveals any documents believed to be classified on an unclassified Army network, they need to deal with it. That the documents have leaked is relatively immaterial - presumably a lot of auditing is done automatically, and adding exceptions is a lot riskier than simply blanket blocking anything that contains indications that it's marked classified, secret or similar. Even with manual audits, you don't want to give the people doing the audits too much freedom in accepting documents they think have been publicly disseminated, or the extra workload of trying to assess what info is ok. Even IF all the documents found have already been published, they'd for security reasons still want to track down how the documents ended up on the unclassified network in case the route was via another leak that potentially might have more documents. Or it might even indicate the source of the leaks. In other words, it's easier and safer for them to just assume that if a document is marked classified in any way, it shouldn't ever be found on unclassified networks - then they don't have to deal with the mess of trying to ensure it's an indication of a security problem.