3 ms·
AES timing variability at a glance (2005)
- bradleyjg 13y agoI like the presentation with the colored graphs, it definitely it a good way of demonstrating the problem. However for his own implementation, it's hard to see how significant the residual timing attacks are. If fact just looking at the graph, and without the acknowledgment in the introduction, I'd be hard pressed to say that those pictures had any irregularity at all.
- rheide 13y agoWouldn't that just mean that you need a lot more tries to do a successful timing attack? Not sure if the regularity of his algorithm is enough to make it entirely impractical. I'm not even sure if it's not entirely impractical already using one of the less regular algorithms.
- omra 13y agoI highly recommend reading the explanation on how this is significant, it goes into more depth about timing attacks: http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf
- pbsd 13y agoAnd a more recent revisiting of this subject, http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/aes_cache.pdf http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/aes_cache.pdf
- vilhelm_s 13y agoSo it seems that modern Intel x86 processors have hardware support for AES (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES_instruction_set http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES_instruction_set). Does that solve the problem?
- pbsd 13y agoPretty much, yes. The instructions are constant-time.
- caf 13y agoIt would be interesting to see how things have progressed (or haven't) in the intervening years.