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Why is everyone so critical? I'm far from an Apple fanboy, having opted to never buy one of their products again, but they deserve major props here. They have t
by StavrosK 13y ago
Why is everyone so critical? I'm far from an Apple fanboy, having opted to never buy one of their products again, but they deserve major props here. They have the constraint of "the system must be easy to use" and, from what I can tell, did pretty much as much as they could to add strong crypto to the mix at no benefit to themselves.
Apple could have just gone "fuck it, let's store it in plaintext, since it's never going to be good enough anyway", but adding strong, transparent encryption to one of the most-used messaging services in existence right now is a very good thing, in my book.
Sure, the transparency introduces some flaws, but Apple has protected itself by a whole slew of passive attacks, which, to my knowledge, is the kind of attack that the mass surveillance state uses, and what a large messaging service is most at risk of.
Getting a warrant and saying "hey, we have a warrant for X, can we look at their communications", and then having Apple MITM that person is much, much more preferable to me than having a government say "we need all your data" and then the provider just handing the data over, since it's all in plaintext.
As it stands, Apple has pretty much disabled large-scale surveillance of iMessage accounts, which is what PRISM and all the furore is about, and people still shit on them?
Can we have some perspective please? If we lambaste any provider who takes steps to safeguard our privacy (again, at no benefit to them, since most people who use iMessage don't even know what encryption is), then what do you think the next service to have the choice in a product will say? "Hmm, I could either store everything in plaintext and have governments strong-arm me into sharing it with them (which I couldn't really care less about), I could build really strong encryption into it and make it an unusable mess for no added benefit to me, or I could build as much encryption into it as doesn't impact usability, again for no benefit to me, and get shat on for not providing option #2. Gee, how can I ever decide?"
If you want strong privacy/security, use Silent Circle (disclosure I work for them etc). If you care about your day-to-day privacy and want to talk to people you know, you could do much worse than iMessage.
- andor 13y agoApple could have just gone "fuck it, let's store it in plaintext, since it's never going to be good enough anyway", but adding strong, transparent encryption to one of the most-used messaging services in existence right now is a very good thing, in my book. That's the point of the article: the messages stored on iCloud aren't encrypted. The claim that iMessage uses end-to-end encryption is worthless.
- brigade 13y agoYou aren't required to use iCloud Backup to use iMessage. They're completely separate services.
- jlgaddis 13y agoThe messages are encrypted end-to-end. What you do with them once they've arrived (e.g. backing them up to iCloud) has nothing to do with the transport. A co-worker and I send encrypted e-mails back and forth occasionally. If he decrypts my attachments and saves them to his hard drive to work with, that doesn't mean that e-mailing them in an encrypted form was worthless.
- jonknee 13y agoSure, but this is all transparent to the user. Apple heavily pushed iCloud backups and doesn't mention that it throws any data security out of the water. You hear iMessages are secure and then you accept the "use iCloud backup" question that appears right after you get your device. Except now your messages aren't secure. Apple did a great thing by making iMessage secure by default. They should do a similarly great thing by making iCloud backups secure or by making it very obvious to the user that they are not secure (and what that means for your other "secure" data).
- jimsilverman 13y agoagreed. i think the most important takeaway here is that the reactionary press release "Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy" was very carefully worded to give the customer a sense of security. it's definitely not telling the full story, but it serves its purpose of reassuring a concerned user base.
- rainforest 13y agoIsn't it possible that iCloud backups are encrypted in storage? Apple could be holding the key in encrypted form and sending that to the device with a backup. If the user's password is used as the passphrase to the key, then only the user can use the key to decrypt it. Apple could hold a second key, with passphrases set to secret answers for reset scenarios - that would let them regenerate the normal password-encrypted key for the chosen changed password. This seems likely given they offer to store your key for FileVault[1] under some secret answers. I think this delivers the same level of "secure" in the sense that, provided they don't store the passwords you submit (possible law enforcement request), then they shouldn't be able to decrypt your iCloud backups either. 1: http://support.apple.com/kb/ht4790 http://support.apple.com/kb/ht4790
- rythie 13y agoBecause Apple said they were doing end-to-end encryption: "For example, conversations which take place over iMessage and FaceTime are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can see or read them. Apple cannot decrypt that data. " From: http://www.apple.com/apples-commitment-to-customer-privacy/ http://www.apple.com/apples-commitment-to-customer-privacy/
- lttlrck 13y agoThe article doesn't disprove end-to-end encryption.
- pcl 13y ago"End-to-end encryption" is a pretty empty phrase. The author did demonstrate that recently-delivered messages may be accessed without device-specific or user-specific secrets in place. So, even if all the transports on all the hops between all the machines in the message delivery chain are encrypted, Apple is able to access the plain text of at least the recently-sent messages.
- embolism 13y agoActually the author didn't prove this. The author entered their account password to retrieve the backup. Restoring the most recent day of messages could be done from a plaintext backup or it could be done by loading an encrypted batch from the iMessage servers. We don't have enough information to know for certain either way.
- pcl 13y agoThe author said that he changed his password and then got a new device and accessed recent iMessages on it. So that rules out the password as the encryption key.
- epistasis 13y agoIt rules out the password as the encryption key, but it doesn't rule out encrypted backups. Implementations of encrypted volumes, such as in LUKS on Linux, commonly use the password as something that unlocks the real encryption key. So during password change, the new password could be used to re-encrypt the backup encryption key, making it so that as long as Apple doesn't store the passwords, Apple can't have access to the encrypted backups. However, this is really far into the weeds on a topic that doesn't matter so much, as none of it really relates to Apple's claims about iMessages.
- ippisl 13y agoyou present a false choice between security and ease of use. They could easily add a security layer that uses a short authentication code, that let's people in physical connection(say spouses) verify their texts are secured. Just a simple optional feature. But how much security can you guarrantee with closed source anyway?
- anologwintermut 13y agoWhy is everyone being so critical of Skype? Skype deserves major props here. "They have the constraint of 'the system must be easy to use' and, from what I can tell, did pretty much as much as they could to add strong crypto to the mix at no benefit to themselves." Which is actually, as far as we know, true for Skype too. The reason is both systems acquired a reputation (one that Apple's PRISM press release courted) that they were three letter agency proof(at least for most TLA's). That reputation, we now know, at least for Skype was erroneous long before Microsoft bought them and might be for Apple. Yes, Apple deserves major props for deploying end to end crypto , but IChat security reputation is inaccurate.