4 ms·
> The sad thing is there's really no crypto to understand here. The simple and obvious point is this: if I could do this experiment, then someone at Apple could
by danso 13y ago
> The sad thing is there's really no crypto to understand here. The simple and obvious point is this: if I could do this experiment, then someone at Apple could have done it too. Possibly at the request of law enforcement. All they need are your iForgot security questions, something that Apple almost certainly does keep.
It's an interesting meta-question about why Apple's claim was taken at face value. Not just by the public but by Apple's many scoffing critics? The Mat Honan incident should have been a clear sign that Apple's security mindset had a gaping hole:
http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/all/ http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-hona...
> Apple tech support confirmed to me twice over the weekend that all you need to access someone's AppleID is the associated email address, a credit card number, the billing address, and the last four digits of a credit card on file. I was very clear about this. During my second tech support call to AppleCare, the representative confirmed this to me. "That's really all you have to have to verify something with us," he said.
That's a pretty grievous oversight. Why should Apple get the benefit of the doubt that they've solved the holy grail of security...that is, having lockbox security without impact to user convenience? In the above-cited case of AppleID access, they hadn't overcome that tradeoff and appear to have erred on the side of user convenience, at the cost of security.
- smackfu 13y agoThey have introduced two-factor for password resets since then, which everyone should enable.