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It doesn't protect you meaningfully as an EC2 user, since there's no (current, on AWS) way to do an "encrypted VM" where everything including memory is encrypte
by rdl 13y ago
It doesn't protect you meaningfully as an EC2 user, since there's no (current, on AWS) way to do an "encrypted VM" where everything including memory is encrypted and the hypervisor can't be coerced into decrypting it en masse.
It does protect you for S3 if and only if you conduct the crypto outside AWS and generate/manage the keys yourself (e.g. how tarsnap does it). It may protect you for some of the other AWS services IFF you use them in the same hybrid way, but I don't know of anyone who uses AWS's database services without just using EC2 nodes primarily to talk to them.
- SpikeGronim 13y agoAFAIK there is no curent, practical "encrypted VM" that can protect itself from the hypervisor. Homomorphic encryption can theoretically do that, but is very slow and unproven right now.
- rdl 13y agoThere are tricks you can do with Intel TXT to trust only the CPU and cache (TRESOR is an example) http://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/tresor http://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/tresor It's missing a few elements you'd need to build a really awesome secure cloud, though. (actually, intel hardware was missing it)
- Nimi 13y agoI only glimpsed it some years ago, but I got the impression that "anything the vendor can do, the attacker can circumvent one level deeper", especially as a criticism of TXT: http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Wojtczuk_Rutkowska/BlackHat-DC-09-Rutkowska-Attacking-Intel-TXT-slides.pdf http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Wojtczuk_Rutk...
- rdl 13y agoSTM fixed that particular set of problems in 2010/2011. There are still issues with making all of this stuff useful, though.