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From the article: > "If a widespread pattern of [knock-and-announce] violations were shown . . . there would be reason for grave concern." > —Supreme Court

From the article: > "If a widespread pattern of [knock-and-announce] violations were shown . . . there would be reason for grave concern." > —Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, in Hudson v. Michigan, June 15, 2006. From the graph they present, I cannot determine a pattern. That has nothing to do with the necessity of the raids.

akiselev 13y ago
Read the opinion: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=04-1360 http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vo... The court found that a single "knock-and-announce" violation (not waiting 10 to 20 seconds in this case) wasn't enough to disqualify evidence that was found in the hours following, during the execution of the search warrant. What Kennedy meant was that if this wasn't an isolated incident and was in-fact becoming a common side effect of police procedure, then the legal system would have to start reevaluating how strict it will be with such violations. Relevant paragraphs: Today's decision does not address any demonstrated pattern of knock-and-announce violations. If a widespread pattern of violations were shown, and particularly if those violations were committed against persons who lacked the means or voice to mount an effective protest, there would be reason for grave concern. Even then, however, the Court would have to acknowledge that extending the remedy of exclusion to all the evidence seized following a knock-and-announce violation would mean revising the requirement of causation that limits our discretion in applying the exclusionary rule. That type of extension also would have significant practical implications, adding to the list of issues requiring resolution at the criminal trial questions such as whether police officers entered a home after waiting 10 seconds or 20. In this case the relevant evidence was discovered not because of a failure to knock-and-announce, but because of a subsequent search pursuant to a lawful warrant. The Court in my view is correct to hold that suppression was not required. While I am not convinced that Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984), and New York v. Harris, 495 U. S. 14 (1990), have as much relevance here as Justice Scalia appears to conclude, the Court's holding is fully supported by Parts I through III of its opinion. I accordingly join those Parts and concur in the judgment.

akiselev 13y ago

Read the opinion: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=04-1360 http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vo... The court found that a single "knock-and-announce" violation (not waiting 10 to 20 seconds in this case) wasn't enough to disqualify evidence that was found in the hours following, during the execution of the search warrant. What Kennedy meant was that if this wasn't an isolated incident and was in-fact becoming a common side effect of police procedure, then the legal system would have to start reevaluating how strict it will be with such violations. Relevant paragraphs: Today's decision does not address any demonstrated pattern of knock-and-announce violations. If a widespread pattern of violations were shown, and particularly if those violations were committed against persons who lacked the means or voice to mount an effective protest, there would be reason for grave concern. Even then, however, the Court would have to acknowledge that extending the remedy of exclusion to all the evidence seized following a knock-and-announce violation would mean revising the requirement of causation that limits our discretion in applying the exclusionary rule. That type of extension also would have significant practical implications, adding to the list of issues requiring resolution at the criminal trial questions such as whether police officers entered a home after waiting 10 seconds or 20. In this case the relevant evidence was discovered not because of a failure to knock-and-announce, but because of a subsequent search pursuant to a lawful warrant. The Court in my view is correct to hold that suppression was not required. While I am not convinced that Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984), and New York v. Harris, 495 U. S. 14 (1990), have as much relevance here as Justice Scalia appears to conclude, the Court's holding is fully supported by Parts I through III of its opinion. I accordingly join those Parts and concur in the judgment.