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It's a common problem in defense, especially in the last 20 years. As budgets continue to shrink, countries are under pressure to cut the number of units purcha

It's a common problem in defense, especially in the last 20 years. As budgets continue to shrink, countries are under pressure to cut the number of units purchased, which increases the per-unit price (design and development, being fixed costs, have to be spread amongst a smaller number of units.) For new designs coming about after '91, it's even harder as the design work is being done at the same time. With systems like the F-35, LCS, AAAV, NH90, and others, the money is shrinking even as development is taking place, and the spiraling costs of systems that "can do everything" in an environment where no one can assume was the nature of the next generation of threats will be has made procurement something of a disaster. The last element is national. European nations are reluctant, no matter how much money it may save, to completely forgo their national defense industries in favor of larger conglomerates or the U.S. There are many areas of overlap where there is already a better, proven alternative in the market (Airbus A400M could be served by the C-17, NH90 can be handled by the SH60 series, Nimrod MRA4 by the P-8. I note all of the alternatives in favor of U.S. kit, but there are older examples of this happening in the other direction)

hef19898 13y ago
there's one great read that discribes the fundamental flaws of defense procurement pretty well (http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/full-labyrinth-text-w-covers.pdf http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/full-labyrinth-text-w-cove...). Mainly geared towards the US, but the basics works for Germany, too. As far as the procurment of the NH90 and Tiger is concerned, there are more flaws in the specification, design and program that fit in a book. Everybody aims at a silver bullet solution only to end up with a one made of lead for the price of a golden one. One point that dtruck me most when I was still part of the "system" was the shere amount of spec and design changes that happened AFTER development was finished. the solution is called Retrofit. That and the important difference of a design to be able to perform a certain task and a design being allowed to perform it by the german army. One example is the NH90 not able to transport troops with combat gear (German army view pint) and the NH90 being suvvessfully used to airlift troop over half of Finland. Another one would be the Eurofighter being unable to perform ground support operations in the german air force and the very same plane doing just that for the british. And the A400M would be apretty good plane hadn't politians insisted on a new prop engine built by a paneuropean consortium that did that for the very first time. That other planes would be just as good, agree. Even i would have rather opted for the Antonov An70 :-) What really sad about the NH90 is the wasted potential. Considering the age of the Blackhawks, the potential market is HUGE. The situation being what it is, this ain't gone happen. But that's a point the NH90 has in common with the F-35, doesn't it?
- ckozlowski 13y ago
  Thanks for the document. I've only started reading it, but it looks rather good. (I'm astonished and thrilled that in the essays, the authors cite their sources.) Good find. =)
snogglethorpe 13y ago
> Airbus A400M could be served by the C-17 Aren't these rather different sorts of plane, despite the overall similarities? The C-17 uses jet engines, has a rather big capacity, and is intended for landing on prepared fields, making it more of a "strategic" military transport. The A400M, on the other hand, uses turboprops, has a smaller capacity, and is supposedly able to use rough landing strips, moving it more towards the "tactical" end of the military transport spectrum. [Of course there are many other planes that might have served too, but each has various tradeoffs...]
- ckozlowski 13y ago
  The C-17 has a rough field capability. You're correct though; the A400M was intended to fill a position between the C-17 at the high end, and the C-130 at the low end. The issues arose when it later became clear that there may not have been as much of a market for slot as originally envisioned. The C-17 handles vehicles easier than the A400M (where there's lower than expected weight restrictions on what can be carried) while not providing the savings expected for palatalized cargo that the newest models of the C-130(J) can handle. So it's being pressed from both sides. Of course, the C-17 had teething problems in the beginning. But it benefited from a better environment at the time. In any case, big item procurement is an utter mess these days. The money is drying up fast after the end of the cold-war, and the inefficient and wasteful structure that thrived during that time can no longer do so. So we get massively overpriced and delayed equipment.

hef19898 13y ago

there's one great read that discribes the fundamental flaws of defense procurement pretty well (http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/full-labyrinth-text-w-covers.pdf http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/full-labyrinth-text-w-cove...). Mainly geared towards the US, but the basics works for Germany, too. As far as the procurment of the NH90 and Tiger is concerned, there are more flaws in the specification, design and program that fit in a book. Everybody aims at a silver bullet solution only to end up with a one made of lead for the price of a golden one. One point that dtruck me most when I was still part of the "system" was the shere amount of spec and design changes that happened AFTER development was finished. the solution is called Retrofit. That and the important difference of a design to be able to perform a certain task and a design being allowed to perform it by the german army. One example is the NH90 not able to transport troops with combat gear (German army view pint) and the NH90 being suvvessfully used to airlift troop over half of Finland. Another one would be the Eurofighter being unable to perform ground support operations in the german air force and the very same plane doing just that for the british. And the A400M would be apretty good plane hadn't politians insisted on a new prop engine built by a paneuropean consortium that did that for the very first time. That other planes would be just as good, agree. Even i would have rather opted for the Antonov An70 :-) What really sad about the NH90 is the wasted potential. Considering the age of the Blackhawks, the potential market is HUGE. The situation being what it is, this ain't gone happen. But that's a point the NH90 has in common with the F-35, doesn't it?

ckozlowski 13y ago
Thanks for the document. I've only started reading it, but it looks rather good. (I'm astonished and thrilled that in the essays, the authors cite their sources.) Good find. =)

snogglethorpe 13y ago

> Airbus A400M could be served by the C-17 Aren't these rather different sorts of plane, despite the overall similarities? The C-17 uses jet engines, has a rather big capacity, and is intended for landing on prepared fields, making it more of a "strategic" military transport. The A400M, on the other hand, uses turboprops, has a smaller capacity, and is supposedly able to use rough landing strips, moving it more towards the "tactical" end of the military transport spectrum. [Of course there are many other planes that might have served too, but each has various tradeoffs...]

ckozlowski 13y ago
The C-17 has a rough field capability. You're correct though; the A400M was intended to fill a position between the C-17 at the high end, and the C-130 at the low end. The issues arose when it later became clear that there may not have been as much of a market for slot as originally envisioned. The C-17 handles vehicles easier than the A400M (where there's lower than expected weight restrictions on what can be carried) while not providing the savings expected for palatalized cargo that the newest models of the C-130(J) can handle. So it's being pressed from both sides. Of course, the C-17 had teething problems in the beginning. But it benefited from a better environment at the time. In any case, big item procurement is an utter mess these days. The money is drying up fast after the end of the cold-war, and the inefficient and wasteful structure that thrived during that time can no longer do so. So we get massively overpriced and delayed equipment.