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They lied, they listen to our phone calls and read our emails. In the Guardian story[0] it explained it like this: "Retain and make use of "inadvertently acqui
by guelo 13y ago
They lied, they listen to our phone calls and read our emails.
In the Guardian story[0] it explained it like this: "Retain and make use of "inadvertently acquired" domestic communications if they contain usable intelligence, information on criminal activity, threat of harm to people or property, are encrypted, or are believed to contain any information relevant to cybersecurity;"
How can they know if it contains usable intelligence, criminal activity, etc. if they aren't examining the contents of the communication?
I think the most outrageous in that list is "make use of ... information on criminal activity". Do NSA spooks get to singlehandedly determine that you're committing a crime? Do they have AI algorithms that sift through millions of records flagging potential criminal activity? If someone is heard saying, for example, that they smoked weed are they added to a federal database of weed smokers? Why is a military program supposedly concerned with terrorism interested in domestic criminal activity?
[0] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-w...
- dhimes 13y agoAnd encrypting information makes it suspicious. I am nauseated.
- codex 13y agoIt's not that encrypted information is itself suspicious. If a communication is encrypted, the NSA simply can't tell if it's a legitimate foreign target intercept or some inadvertently picked up communication until the NSA is finally able to decrypt it. Were it not so, foreign targets could evade the NSA by encrypting their traffic and making it appear that it might be domestic material (for example, routing it though domestic email accounts), forcing the NSA to discard it. Just as security researchers look for every possible loophole when creating attack scenarios, so the authors of NSA regulations seek to close any possible loophole a target could use to evade intercept. The NSA has to assume that its internal rules will eventually be leaked (as has just occurred) and used against it by a foreign enemy.
- MereInterest 13y ago"I'm sorry. I couldn't read your mail to figure out whether I am allowed to read your mail. Therefore, I am keeping your mail until I figure out whether or not I am allowed to keep it." Yes, they try to make the rules to close all possible loopholes. No, they shouldn't be the ones making their own rules, since they have a very vested interest in one-sided rules.
- leoc 13y agoI'm not sure: did they lie? I'm not sure how the revealed procedures fit in, or fail to fit in, with the exceptions permitted under FISA http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg178... and the FISA Amendments Act http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6304/text http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6304/text , which of course were public knowledge already. (IANAL, and FISA + FAA is an ugly tangle of legal spaghetti.) One thing that certainly is countenanced in FISA is sharing information about criminal activity with US law enforcement (though it's far from obvious to me that the procedures for this laid out in the documents fully comply with FISA 101). And I mean, imagine if it were otherwise? If in the course of accidentally overhearing some US domestic communications the NSA comes across information about, say, a huge massacre planned on US soil, wouldn't it be pretty perverse and unreasonable if the law prohibited them from letting US law enforcement know anything about it?