4 ms·

And this is why we should (and we should encourage everybody we can to) regularly do the most mundane of browsing using TOR. And that's why I encourage everybo

by dfc 13y ago

And this is why we should (and we should encourage everybody we can to) regularly do the most mundane of browsing using TOR. And that's why I encourage everybody I can to run a tor node https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay.html.en https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay.html.en

tlrobinson 13y ago
Also, if you don't want to run a node on your home network/machine http://cloud.torproject.org/ http://cloud.torproject.org/ makes it ridiculously easy to set up one on EC2 (for as little as ~$3/month)
- dfc 13y ago
  Q: Should I run an exit relay from my home? A: No. If law enforcement becomes interested in traffic from your exit relay, it's possible that officers will seize your computer. For that reason, it's best not to run your exit relay in your home or using your home Internet connection. Instead, consider running your exit relay in a commercial facility that is supportive of Tor. Have a separate IP address for your exit relay, and don't route your own traffic through it. Of course, you should avoid keeping any sensitive or personal information on the computer hosting your exit relay, and you never should use that machine for any illegal purpose. https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq
  - gizmo686 13y ago
    Its worth pointing out that that is talking specifically about exit nodes. There is no (legal) problem with running relay nodes out of your own house.
    - dfc 13y ago
      What part of "Should I run an exit relay from my home?" was unclear? I am not trying to discourage people from supporting the tor network, quite the opposite actually. I want to make sure they are fully informed and support tor in a manner that is sustainable.
      - tlrobinson 13y ago
        Some people might not realize there are different types of nodes you can run.
- slacka 13y ago
  I'm running one of these on my free EC2 account and can attest to the ridiculously easy part. It took me < 5 min to setup. If you want to avoid paying any fees, just have to make 1 change to the torrc file bandwidth settings. Also, make a great ubuntu sandbox to play with. For example, I'm running a joomla test server with it.
  - neon_electro 13y ago
    I also am running a Tor relay on EC2, and I was under the assumption that I wouldn't have to worry about charges with a stock install. Can you provide more detail about what I should do to my instance to prevent charges?
    - slacka 13y ago
      Edit your your /etc/tor/torrc And change the AccountingMax line to: AccountingMax 3000 MB This will reduce the monthly usage to 12GB and keep you under the 15GB limit. I've been running this bridge for a few months now and have never gone over.
newman314 13y ago
What is the current number of Tor nodes? What's to say that all tor nodes are now monitored? It's possibly a smaller task than storing all voice calls etc.
- hnha 13y ago
  It might seem a smaller task in terms of needed servers but your suspicion fails with the simple fact that anyone can add a relay to the network and thus counter the surveillance. I run a non-exit node on every webserver I got because it's cheap and feels good.
  - gizmo686 13y ago
    You don't need to run all of the exit nodes. If a group controls even 10% of the exit node bandwidth, then they have access to 10% of the traffic and can do major analysis. Even if you use end to end encryption (as in https), than with 10% of the endnote bandwidth, they would see the entry and exit of 1% of all packets, and can (probably) correlate them (with timing) to associate the incoming and outgoing. And if you use tor regularly, then every time either your entry or exit node changes, they get another 1% dice roll.
    - dfc 13y ago
      Q: What are Entry Guards? A: Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For example, suppose the attacker controls or watches the Tor relay you choose to enter the network, and also controls or watches the website you visit. In this case, the research community knows no practical low-latency design that can reliably stop the attacker from correlating volume and timing information on the two sides. So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe, C relays. Suppose there are N relays total. If you select new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability (c/n)2. But profiling is, for most users, as bad as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the attacker noticing more often. Thus, choosing many random entries and exits gives the user no chance of escaping profiling by this kind of attacker. The solution is "entry guards": each Tor client selects a few relays at random to use as entry points, and uses only those relays for her first hop. If those relays are not controlled or observed, the attacker can't win, ever, and the user is secure. If those relays are observed or controlled by the attacker, the attacker sees a larger fraction of the user's traffic — but still the user is no more profiled than before. Thus, the user has some chance (on the order of (n-c)/n) of avoiding profiling, whereas she had none before. You can read more at An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols, Defending Anonymous Communication Against Passive Logging Attacks, and especially Locating Hidden Servers. https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards

by dfc 13y ago

tlrobinson 13y ago

Also, if you don't want to run a node on your home network/machine http://cloud.torproject.org/ http://cloud.torproject.org/ makes it ridiculously easy to set up one on EC2 (for as little as ~$3/month)

dfc 13y ago
Q: Should I run an exit relay from my home? A: No. If law enforcement becomes interested in traffic from your exit relay, it's possible that officers will seize your computer. For that reason, it's best not to run your exit relay in your home or using your home Internet connection. Instead, consider running your exit relay in a commercial facility that is supportive of Tor. Have a separate IP address for your exit relay, and don't route your own traffic through it. Of course, you should avoid keeping any sensitive or personal information on the computer hosting your exit relay, and you never should use that machine for any illegal purpose. https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq
- gizmo686 13y ago
  Its worth pointing out that that is talking specifically about exit nodes. There is no (legal) problem with running relay nodes out of your own house.
  - dfc 13y ago
    What part of "Should I run an exit relay from my home?" was unclear? I am not trying to discourage people from supporting the tor network, quite the opposite actually. I want to make sure they are fully informed and support tor in a manner that is sustainable.
    - tlrobinson 13y ago
      Some people might not realize there are different types of nodes you can run.
slacka 13y ago
I'm running one of these on my free EC2 account and can attest to the ridiculously easy part. It took me < 5 min to setup. If you want to avoid paying any fees, just have to make 1 change to the torrc file bandwidth settings. Also, make a great ubuntu sandbox to play with. For example, I'm running a joomla test server with it.
- neon_electro 13y ago
  I also am running a Tor relay on EC2, and I was under the assumption that I wouldn't have to worry about charges with a stock install. Can you provide more detail about what I should do to my instance to prevent charges?
  - slacka 13y ago
    Edit your your /etc/tor/torrc And change the AccountingMax line to: AccountingMax 3000 MB This will reduce the monthly usage to 12GB and keep you under the 15GB limit. I've been running this bridge for a few months now and have never gone over.

newman314 13y ago

What is the current number of Tor nodes? What's to say that all tor nodes are now monitored? It's possibly a smaller task than storing all voice calls etc.

hnha 13y ago
It might seem a smaller task in terms of needed servers but your suspicion fails with the simple fact that anyone can add a relay to the network and thus counter the surveillance. I run a non-exit node on every webserver I got because it's cheap and feels good.
- gizmo686 13y ago
  You don't need to run all of the exit nodes. If a group controls even 10% of the exit node bandwidth, then they have access to 10% of the traffic and can do major analysis. Even if you use end to end encryption (as in https), than with 10% of the endnote bandwidth, they would see the entry and exit of 1% of all packets, and can (probably) correlate them (with timing) to associate the incoming and outgoing. And if you use tor regularly, then every time either your entry or exit node changes, they get another 1% dice roll.
  - dfc 13y ago
    Q: What are Entry Guards? A: Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For example, suppose the attacker controls or watches the Tor relay you choose to enter the network, and also controls or watches the website you visit. In this case, the research community knows no practical low-latency design that can reliably stop the attacker from correlating volume and timing information on the two sides. So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe, C relays. Suppose there are N relays total. If you select new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability (c/n)2. But profiling is, for most users, as bad as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the attacker noticing more often. Thus, choosing many random entries and exits gives the user no chance of escaping profiling by this kind of attacker. The solution is "entry guards": each Tor client selects a few relays at random to use as entry points, and uses only those relays for her first hop. If those relays are not controlled or observed, the attacker can't win, ever, and the user is secure. If those relays are observed or controlled by the attacker, the attacker sees a larger fraction of the user's traffic — but still the user is no more profiled than before. Thus, the user has some chance (on the order of (n-c)/n) of avoiding profiling, whereas she had none before. You can read more at An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols, Defending Anonymous Communication Against Passive Logging Attacks, and especially Locating Hidden Servers. https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards