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> Computer vision is a subfield of AI... One that isn't close to being to process images the way rats can. > Robots can run, and running has nothing to do wit

by andreyf 18y ago

> Computer vision is a subfield of AI... One that isn't close to being to process images the way rats can. > Robots can run, and running has nothing to do with consciousness. An animal can learn a new gait if it loses a leg. As far as I'm aware, no robot can do that. I was giving examples of what mice can do, not of consciousness. > You've totally missed the point of the Chinese Room [...] Good point. Good things I dropped the philosophy major :) > The only limit on the speed of computation is the speed of light (and the physical size of the universe limits parallelization). Also, our architecture. The point I've heard Searle argue (not the Chinese Room, I guess) is that the computers we build now don't have an architecture are as likely to simulate consciousness, given the constraints of the universe, as a convoluted system of telegraphs. Unless you can explain to me why no such deconstruction is possible, I have no reason to accept that deciding is not computation. In other words, if it's not computation, then what is it? Let me give my point another shot - deconstruction of consciousness is possible, but not in a way which can be simulated by our current machine architecture. It'll be a DFA, just like all current computers. Do you suppose a brain is a DFA? Which do you suppose has more states - all of the computers in the world, or a single mouse brain?

endtime 18y ago
>One that isn't close to being to process images the way rats can. Can you justify that? CV systems can track motion, detect objects, do OCR, etc. I don't know much about rats, but I'd imagine that modern CV systems are more powerful than rats. >An animal can learn a new gait if it loses a leg. As far as I'm aware, no robot can do that. I was giving examples of what mice can do, not of consciousness. Uh, okay. If you want to see organic-looking gait, look up Big Dog. Here's a video, deep linked to a part where it stumbles on ice and regains its balance: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHJJQ0zNNOM#t=1m25s http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHJJQ0zNNOM#t=1m25s. In general, neural nets often exhibit organic-seeming behavior. In any case, I don't think that mammalian joint structure (which, and I'm just guessing here, is probably what creates the kind of motion we think of as organic) has anything to do with consciousness. >Also, our architecture. The point I've heard Searle argue (not the Chinese Room, I guess) is that the computers we build now don't have an architecture are as likely to simulate consciousness, given the constraints of the universe, as a convoluted system of telegraphs. Well, we could build different hardware, but it seems much more interesting to simulate a mind in software, in which case architecture doesn't matter. >Let me give my point another shot - deconstruction of consciousness is possible, but not in a way which can be simulated by our current machine architecture. Why not? Sure, our processors are a bit slow, but that's not really an argument for fundamental impossibility. >Do you suppose a brain is a DFA? Which do you suppose has more states - all of the computers in the world, or a single mouse brain? Not that it's especially meaningful, but I'd imagine all the computers in the world do. To try and give you a better answer, I googled "number of neurons in a mouse brain" and the first result was "IBM's BlueGene L supercomputer simulates half a mouse brain" from 2007: http://www.engadget.com/2007/04/29/ibms-bluegene-l-supercomputer-simulates-half-a-mouse-brain/ http://www.engadget.com/2007/04/29/ibms-bluegene-l-supercomp...

by andreyf 18y ago

endtime 18y ago

>One that isn't close to being to process images the way rats can. Can you justify that? CV systems can track motion, detect objects, do OCR, etc. I don't know much about rats, but I'd imagine that modern CV systems are more powerful than rats. >An animal can learn a new gait if it loses a leg. As far as I'm aware, no robot can do that. I was giving examples of what mice can do, not of consciousness. Uh, okay. If you want to see organic-looking gait, look up Big Dog. Here's a video, deep linked to a part where it stumbles on ice and regains its balance: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHJJQ0zNNOM#t=1m25s http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHJJQ0zNNOM#t=1m25s. In general, neural nets often exhibit organic-seeming behavior. In any case, I don't think that mammalian joint structure (which, and I'm just guessing here, is probably what creates the kind of motion we think of as organic) has anything to do with consciousness. >Also, our architecture. The point I've heard Searle argue (not the Chinese Room, I guess) is that the computers we build now don't have an architecture are as likely to simulate consciousness, given the constraints of the universe, as a convoluted system of telegraphs. Well, we could build different hardware, but it seems much more interesting to simulate a mind in software, in which case architecture doesn't matter. >Let me give my point another shot - deconstruction of consciousness is possible, but not in a way which can be simulated by our current machine architecture. Why not? Sure, our processors are a bit slow, but that's not really an argument for fundamental impossibility. >Do you suppose a brain is a DFA? Which do you suppose has more states - all of the computers in the world, or a single mouse brain? Not that it's especially meaningful, but I'd imagine all the computers in the world do. To try and give you a better answer, I googled "number of neurons in a mouse brain" and the first result was "IBM's BlueGene L supercomputer simulates half a mouse brain" from 2007: http://www.engadget.com/2007/04/29/ibms-bluegene-l-supercomputer-simulates-half-a-mouse-brain/ http://www.engadget.com/2007/04/29/ibms-bluegene-l-supercomp...