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Would it be crazy to think that Google may have given the NSA a copy of their SSL certificate?
by signed0 13y ago
Would it be crazy to think that Google may have given the NSA a copy of their SSL certificate?
- proksoup 13y agoWe've known about the AT&T closets for years right? My understanding of SSL is weak, but if the NSA theoretically acquired the right private keys / SSL certificates / whatever through hook or by crook, they couldn't just watch everything then could they? Are the PRISM slide dates when they acquired said certificates/keys for said providers? Were non-legal means of acquiring used? My real question is - Does it matter that the collection of data is outside of Google's control? Should Google care that in the process of Google collecting data the NSA is intercepting it. Should Google want to stop that, if it were theoretically happening "in the middle". Google's attitude scares me.
- pvnick 13y agoI was thinking the same thing. I wonder how many (if any) FISA orders were for SSL keys. If I were Keith Alexander those would be high on my list.
- keysize 13y agoWould it be crazy to think that Google still uses 1024-bit SSL certificates at a time when even Godaddy recommends a bigger size? Because they do.
- packetslave 13y agoHere's an interview question for you: "You're currently using 1024-bit SSL certificates. You want to start using 2048-bit certificates instead. What do you need to worry about if you're the size of Google?"
- Matt_Cutts 13y agoWe're in the process of upgrading to 2048 bits: http://thenextweb.com/google/2013/05/23/google-to-upgrade-its-ssl-certificates-to-2048-bit-keys-by-end-of-2013-will-start-the-process-on-august-1/ http://thenextweb.com/google/2013/05/23/google-to-upgrade-it...
- tlrobinson 13y agoAre most SMTP servers even using SSL at this point?
- zetafunction 13y agoGoogle is using SSL with ECDHE which provides perfect forward secrecy. Having a copy of the SSL certificate won't do the NSA any good.
- vidarh 13y agoIt's not try it wouldn't do them any good. It just ensures that they can't use the cert to go back and look at old data streams and decrypt them. It doesn't prevent them from using a cert for man in the middle attacks, for example.
- kalmi10 13y agoBut of course one can't mitm all google traffic without someone noticing. (Discussion releated to this topic is getting quite redundant on HN. Same discussion in every thread.)
- cromwellian 13y agoChrome also uses ChannelID.
- duaneb 13y agoDoesn't help with MITM, only after the case.
- Amadou 13y agoHow hard would it be for the NSA to "partner" with the SSL accelerator manufacturers to add functionality that sends copies of all the ECDHE negotiated keys to the NSA so that they can decrypt most of the encrypted traffic that they captured off the backbones?
- lazyjones 13y agoOne of us is misunderstanding the definition of perfect forward secrecy. From what I understand, it protects past/current session keys if one private key is compromised in the future. It does not protect session keys after one key is compromised (e.g. the NSA has Google's private key) and certainly not when all private keys are compromised and the attacker can observe all handshakes etc. Agree/disagree?
- duaneb 13y agoWhy get warrants/go through FISA court at all then?