5 ms·
So what inference are we drawing? I honestly wasn't aware that the capability to store all voice traffic was in question. That might be owed to my background in
by bradleyland 13y ago
So what inference are we drawing? I honestly wasn't aware that the capability to store all voice traffic was in question. That might be owed to my background in telecom though.
Telephone codecs are extremely low bitrate (relative to something like music, much less video) because you have very clear design constraints, and those constraints are forgiving. You just need to be able to understand the caller's voice, not accurately reproduce a live performance of Beethoven's 5th. I agree that the estimates to store the data are on the very, very high side, but I'm not sure that number is even significant in the whole scope of the challenge.
The challenges in obtaining every phone call made in the US aren't storage related; they're almost entirely collection and aggregation related. These ballpark numbers don't even attempt to factor in that portion of the cost. IMO, the collection, transport, and aggregation systems are easily 8/10ths of the problem, not storage. Storage is an extremely scalable solution.
If the government were going to do something like this, they'd likely tap in to the phone networks at the same places everyone else does. There are major telecom aggregation points - called "tandems" [1] - around the country. If you want to set up your own phone carrier with an actual physical network of your own, this is where you plug in. The government would have to do the same. They can't simply tap in at a single aggregation point, because not all phone calls pass through the same points.
From there, you face the choice of storing the data regionally in several data centers, or attempting to aggregate it all back to a central data center. IMO, a disaggregated approach makes a lot more sense. You could reasonably expect to transport all CDR [2] data back to a central location, but you wouldn't want to send all media (audio data) back to one place. It would be simple enough to only fetch what you need based on a query against call data. You'd want all the the CDR data in one place so you could perform your "big data" analysis on it efficiently, then cherry pick media to pull in for analysis.
I'm certain I haven't even scratched the surface here. This only gets the government long distance calls. It doesn't touch local, or even intraLATA calls. Maybe the government isn't interested in those calls though. Maybe they're only interested in international calls, which makes the problem simpler, not harder.
Others in the thread have mentioned that this should be treated as an "order of magnitude" estimation. I don't think we can draw any inference from this estimation at all, because it represents such a small portion of the problem domain. We also have no idea what the scope of the challenge is.
The entire exercise is pointless when you think about what we're asking. "Can the government actually implement a solution to record every phone call in the US?" I think that's a resounding yes. The solution would look a lot like setting up a tier 2 network provider [3] with extra investment in a storage back end. That's entirely within the realm of possibility given the size of the US Dept of Defense budget.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Class_4_telephone_switch http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Class_4_telephone_switch
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Call_detail_record http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Call_detail_record
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_2_network http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_2_network
- ctdonath 13y agoI'm learning to approach such SWAG discussions filled with "golly, we just have no idea" by computing outer limits to at least establish "it can't possibly get any worse/bigger/costlier than $X". In this case, I was responding to "You might as well throw out any number" by throwing out a ballpark figure for the absolute worst case audio surveillance cost scenario: everyone, all the time. OK, so the final number is really huge, and doesn't take into account the many nuances you mention...but I know that reducing storage costs by orders of magnitude will leave plenty of room to accommodate your real-world details. With that sweeping overgeneralization, I've concluded that whatever the details of implementation and whatever the extent of monitoring desired, the cost is well within the operating expenditure of the US federal government. Now that we know that it's not realistically going to cost more than 5% of gov't spending, we can contrast that with the NSA's actual budget, and guesstimate how big the eavesdropping effort really is from that. If nothing else, it's an exercise to explain to common readers (not you, you're a telecom guy who groks this stuff) that it IS in fact possible (not easy, not cheap, but indeed practically possible) to record every phone call. The scale of capability of some modern technologies is otherwise incomprehensible to most people; they'll dismiss the notion out of hand unless you can quantify it in very simple terms they can instantly grasp, like "recording everyone 24/7 would cost no more than 5% of federal operating costs." Kinda hard to mentally keep up with technology which has expanded a billion-fold in capacity in just 3 decades.
- bradleyland 13y agoI'd agree 100%. If I were establishing an outer limit, I would look at a couple of tier 2 long distance carriers (because there are very few that are nation wide), and add in a company like Backblaze or CrashPlan. It would make a fun exercise to dig in to the quarterly filings of some tier 2 LD carriers, but they buy and sell each other so often, and there are so few that operate nation wide, it ends up being a lot of work. Another possibility would be to compare to a mobile operator like Virgin or MetroPCS. Neither operate their own networks, but they do have their own backend systems. That would give you an idea of the size we're talking. It's really not all that big. I don't think people realize that the technology that drives telephone networks (especially once you get outside the last mile) lends itself very well to snooping.