4 ms·

"If you're being questioned by the police, even subsequent to an arrest, however, your silence should be sufficient." Post-arrest silence cannot be used agains

by Steko 13y ago

"If you're being questioned by the police, even subsequent to an arrest, however, your silence should be sufficient." Post-arrest silence cannot be used against you: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doyle_v._Ohio https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doyle_v._Ohio Pre-arrest silence can be used against you: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenkins_v._Anderson https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenkins_v._Anderson IANAL

colanderman 13y ago
I don't understand how this ruling differs from Jenkins v. Anderson?
rosser 13y ago
In Jenkins, does the Court construe the Defendant's not immediately coming forward about the incident as "silence", or are they talking about his not answering the State's questions prior to his arrest for the incident? Because, if it's the former, that seems reasonable to me: if I kill someone someone with mens rea, I'm presumably less likely to go to the police about it. Contrariwise, it seems to me that jurisprudence's notional "reasonable person", having killed someone in self-defense, would want to inform the authorities immediately, precisely in order to avoid suspicion. Based on some quick study, it seems that is indeed what the Court is taking "silence" to mean: that he stabbed a dude, and didn't come forward about it immediately. SCOTUS didn't say that remaining silent in the face of police questioning prior to an arrest is somehow different from doing so afterwards. They said that his "silence" (i.e., not coming forward immediately about having killed someone in "self-defense") is something that the State can bring up in cross examination, in order to impeach his affirmative defense of self-defense. Again, IANAL, but Jenkins doesn't seem dispositive on the specific question of law at issue in Salinas. Any actual lawyers playing along at home want to tell me where (or whether) I'm wrong? EDIT: a bunch of clarifications and such.
- Steko 13y ago
  "Jenkins doesn't seem dispositive on the specific question of law at issue in Salinas." I guess Salinas is an extension of Jenkins to the somewhat broader circumstances of a suspect not answering direct police questions. While the circumstance of Jenkins are weaker, the actual opinion held that: "The Fifth Amendment ... is not violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility."

by Steko 13y ago

colanderman 13y ago

I don't understand how this ruling differs from Jenkins v. Anderson?

rosser 13y ago

In Jenkins, does the Court construe the Defendant's not immediately coming forward about the incident as "silence", or are they talking about his not answering the State's questions prior to his arrest for the incident? Because, if it's the former, that seems reasonable to me: if I kill someone someone with mens rea, I'm presumably less likely to go to the police about it. Contrariwise, it seems to me that jurisprudence's notional "reasonable person", having killed someone in self-defense, would want to inform the authorities immediately, precisely in order to avoid suspicion. Based on some quick study, it seems that is indeed what the Court is taking "silence" to mean: that he stabbed a dude, and didn't come forward about it immediately. SCOTUS didn't say that remaining silent in the face of police questioning prior to an arrest is somehow different from doing so afterwards. They said that his "silence" (i.e., not coming forward immediately about having killed someone in "self-defense") is something that the State can bring up in cross examination, in order to impeach his affirmative defense of self-defense. Again, IANAL, but Jenkins doesn't seem dispositive on the specific question of law at issue in Salinas. Any actual lawyers playing along at home want to tell me where (or whether) I'm wrong? EDIT: a bunch of clarifications and such.

Steko 13y ago
"Jenkins doesn't seem dispositive on the specific question of law at issue in Salinas." I guess Salinas is an extension of Jenkins to the somewhat broader circumstances of a suspect not answering direct police questions. While the circumstance of Jenkins are weaker, the actual opinion held that: "The Fifth Amendment ... is not violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility."