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>>> Computers [...] cannot pass simple tests of consciousness that a mouse can >>Like what? >Vision, for one. Also, running. Um, ever heard of a digital came

by endtime 18y ago

>>> Computers [...] cannot pass simple tests of consciousness that a mouse can >>Like what? >Vision, for one. Also, running. Um, ever heard of a digital camera? Or if you mean interpreting images, guessing what, they can do that too. Computer vision is a subfield of AI (arguably; I believe some say it's signal processing). Also, blind people are still conscious, so... And running? Sorry, I hate to take this tone, but WTF are you talking about? Robots can run, and running has nothing to do with consciousness. >>If they aren't computing, then what are they doing? You're looking down into the dualism abyss... >I don't think dualism is what he was thinking of, but rather Searle's Chinese Room argument. Coming from a CS-heavy Philosophy-light background, it took me a long time to wrap my mind around what Searle was saying there, but it's a pretty solid point nonetheless. The best way I've found to explain it in CS terms is that while theoretically, intelligence could be modeled using Turing machines, in practice, we will never have a machine fast enough to do so. You've totally missed the point of the Chinese Room. The point is that something can appear to understand without actually doing anything we'd call understanding. In other words, ~Ax(OutwardlyIntelligent(x) -> ActuallyIntelligent(x)). It's an argument against the sufficiency of the Turing Test, that's it. And saying we'll never have a machine fast enough? The only limit on the speed of computation is the speed of light (and the physical size of the universe limits parallelization). But these values also bound our brains. In fact, iirc neurons are actually pretty slow relative to transistors. >>When I make a decision I consult my values and my goals and attempt to make the decision that gets me closest to my goals without compromising my values >We have no idea how you or I make decisions, and the notion that we can intuit how decisions are made is a huge road block in even beginning to think about decision-making. Lakoff, among others, does a great job explaining why "values", "goals", and "morals" are simply justifications we create after we've made a decision. Okay, maybe my deconstruction is correct and maybe it isn't. Whatever. Unless you can explain to me why no such deconstruction is possible, I have no reason to accept that deciding is not computation. In other words, if it's not computation, then what is it? >> And what makes you think we couldn't build a biological computer >We can, and we should - but let's agree that it won't be a Turing machine. Of course it won't. It will be less powerful, because Turing machines have infinite memory and the universe is finite. It'll be a DFA, just like all current computers.

andreyf 18y ago
> Computer vision is a subfield of AI... One that isn't close to being to process images the way rats can. > Robots can run, and running has nothing to do with consciousness. An animal can learn a new gait if it loses a leg. As far as I'm aware, no robot can do that. I was giving examples of what mice can do, not of consciousness. > You've totally missed the point of the Chinese Room [...] Good point. Good things I dropped the philosophy major :) > The only limit on the speed of computation is the speed of light (and the physical size of the universe limits parallelization). Also, our architecture. The point I've heard Searle argue (not the Chinese Room, I guess) is that the computers we build now don't have an architecture are as likely to simulate consciousness, given the constraints of the universe, as a convoluted system of telegraphs. Unless you can explain to me why no such deconstruction is possible, I have no reason to accept that deciding is not computation. In other words, if it's not computation, then what is it? Let me give my point another shot - deconstruction of consciousness is possible, but not in a way which can be simulated by our current machine architecture. It'll be a DFA, just like all current computers. Do you suppose a brain is a DFA? Which do you suppose has more states - all of the computers in the world, or a single mouse brain?
- endtime 18y ago
  >One that isn't close to being to process images the way rats can. Can you justify that? CV systems can track motion, detect objects, do OCR, etc. I don't know much about rats, but I'd imagine that modern CV systems are more powerful than rats. >An animal can learn a new gait if it loses a leg. As far as I'm aware, no robot can do that. I was giving examples of what mice can do, not of consciousness. Uh, okay. If you want to see organic-looking gait, look up Big Dog. Here's a video, deep linked to a part where it stumbles on ice and regains its balance: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHJJQ0zNNOM#t=1m25s http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHJJQ0zNNOM#t=1m25s. In general, neural nets often exhibit organic-seeming behavior. In any case, I don't think that mammalian joint structure (which, and I'm just guessing here, is probably what creates the kind of motion we think of as organic) has anything to do with consciousness. >Also, our architecture. The point I've heard Searle argue (not the Chinese Room, I guess) is that the computers we build now don't have an architecture are as likely to simulate consciousness, given the constraints of the universe, as a convoluted system of telegraphs. Well, we could build different hardware, but it seems much more interesting to simulate a mind in software, in which case architecture doesn't matter. >Let me give my point another shot - deconstruction of consciousness is possible, but not in a way which can be simulated by our current machine architecture. Why not? Sure, our processors are a bit slow, but that's not really an argument for fundamental impossibility. >Do you suppose a brain is a DFA? Which do you suppose has more states - all of the computers in the world, or a single mouse brain? Not that it's especially meaningful, but I'd imagine all the computers in the world do. To try and give you a better answer, I googled "number of neurons in a mouse brain" and the first result was "IBM's BlueGene L supercomputer simulates half a mouse brain" from 2007: http://www.engadget.com/2007/04/29/ibms-bluegene-l-supercomputer-simulates-half-a-mouse-brain/ http://www.engadget.com/2007/04/29/ibms-bluegene-l-supercomp...

by endtime 18y ago

andreyf 18y ago

> Computer vision is a subfield of AI... One that isn't close to being to process images the way rats can. > Robots can run, and running has nothing to do with consciousness. An animal can learn a new gait if it loses a leg. As far as I'm aware, no robot can do that. I was giving examples of what mice can do, not of consciousness. > You've totally missed the point of the Chinese Room [...] Good point. Good things I dropped the philosophy major :) > The only limit on the speed of computation is the speed of light (and the physical size of the universe limits parallelization). Also, our architecture. The point I've heard Searle argue (not the Chinese Room, I guess) is that the computers we build now don't have an architecture are as likely to simulate consciousness, given the constraints of the universe, as a convoluted system of telegraphs. Unless you can explain to me why no such deconstruction is possible, I have no reason to accept that deciding is not computation. In other words, if it's not computation, then what is it? Let me give my point another shot - deconstruction of consciousness is possible, but not in a way which can be simulated by our current machine architecture. It'll be a DFA, just like all current computers. Do you suppose a brain is a DFA? Which do you suppose has more states - all of the computers in the world, or a single mouse brain?

endtime 18y ago
>One that isn't close to being to process images the way rats can. Can you justify that? CV systems can track motion, detect objects, do OCR, etc. I don't know much about rats, but I'd imagine that modern CV systems are more powerful than rats. >An animal can learn a new gait if it loses a leg. As far as I'm aware, no robot can do that. I was giving examples of what mice can do, not of consciousness. Uh, okay. If you want to see organic-looking gait, look up Big Dog. Here's a video, deep linked to a part where it stumbles on ice and regains its balance: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHJJQ0zNNOM#t=1m25s http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHJJQ0zNNOM#t=1m25s. In general, neural nets often exhibit organic-seeming behavior. In any case, I don't think that mammalian joint structure (which, and I'm just guessing here, is probably what creates the kind of motion we think of as organic) has anything to do with consciousness. >Also, our architecture. The point I've heard Searle argue (not the Chinese Room, I guess) is that the computers we build now don't have an architecture are as likely to simulate consciousness, given the constraints of the universe, as a convoluted system of telegraphs. Well, we could build different hardware, but it seems much more interesting to simulate a mind in software, in which case architecture doesn't matter. >Let me give my point another shot - deconstruction of consciousness is possible, but not in a way which can be simulated by our current machine architecture. Why not? Sure, our processors are a bit slow, but that's not really an argument for fundamental impossibility. >Do you suppose a brain is a DFA? Which do you suppose has more states - all of the computers in the world, or a single mouse brain? Not that it's especially meaningful, but I'd imagine all the computers in the world do. To try and give you a better answer, I googled "number of neurons in a mouse brain" and the first result was "IBM's BlueGene L supercomputer simulates half a mouse brain" from 2007: http://www.engadget.com/2007/04/29/ibms-bluegene-l-supercomputer-simulates-half-a-mouse-brain/ http://www.engadget.com/2007/04/29/ibms-bluegene-l-supercomp...