You can similarly map people on the CIA, from desk analysts, to PMOs in the field, and Special Operations Command (esp. "Tier 1" personnel) sides of the house.

You can similarly map people on the CIA, from desk analysts, to PMOs in the field, and Special Operations Command (esp. "Tier 1" personnel) sides of the house. DEVGRU guys really like big 4x4 trucks. I've done extensive research into these 3 areas on LinkedIn for years. I'd love to publish my information, but jail or causing grief to these people and their families doesn't sound appealing to me. The US Intelligence Community still has a dire operational security issue with employees and social networks. A good number of people think they're practicing good security by not mentioning their agency, but these missing dots are easy to connect when you examine their timelines, places of employment/residence (which can be cross-checked with Intellius and so on), and LinkedIn connections. These agencies know about this problem, but they've failed to shore it up properly. Unfortunately, enemies of the US also know about this problem and exploit it routinely. Sadly, it's going to take a sustained media shit storm before something is actually done about it.