3 ms·
Future messages would need to be encrypted using the new key. If the protocol announces when a new key is added to the "encryption set" how can you get away wi
by szc 13y ago
Future messages would need to be encrypted using the new key.
If the protocol announces when a new key is added to the "encryption set" how can you get away with that?
(when you add a new device to iMessage all the other devices "see" the new device being added and tell you about it).
It would be great to see a comparison between OTR and iMessage.
- fpgeek 13y ago> (when you add a new device to iMessage all the other devices "see" the new device being added and tell you about it) And who writes the software on those devices that tells you about the new key again? Based on what I'm reading, absent physical access to one of the devices authorized for using iMessage at the time, past iMessages should be safe. But, given the apparent ease of adding new authorized devices, tapping future iMessages sounds like it wouldn't be hard.