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> For example, conversations which take place over iMessage and FaceTime are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can see or

by nwh 13y ago

> For example, conversations which take place over iMessage and FaceTime are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can see or read them. Apple cannot decrypt that data. I don't see how this can possibly be true. I can sign into iMessage on my MacBook, and then into the same account on my iPhone and see the same messages. The only shared secret between the devices is my password, which means that the private keys must be derived directly from them. As Apple sees my password in plaintext fairly regularly, this is almost next to useless in situation where they are forced to reveal private messages by a government. Given that the client still can't even keep messages in chronological order (even after the update), I severely doubt their encryption is implemented correctly either.

danielsju6 13y ago
Actually the devices share a key bag, the popup notifying you when other devices are using your iMessage information comes up during this exchange. The fact that the messages don't immediately show up on other devices and can be out of order speaks to this P2P cryptographic style. You can search for analysis of their protocol, I've done some dissection and it's pretty solid.
- smackfu 13y ago
  How does this address the concern though? Since a user only needs a password to access past sent messages, the security is only as strong as that password... and Apple can pretty easily circumvent any password related security since they are the ones verifying it.
  - danielsju6 13y ago
    True, you only need your password to issue a new key set to the keybag; you can actually monitor the protocol for devices that are distributed your decryption keys (including Apple if they were spying) and you get a popup on each device alerting you to this. It is possible Apple could create a back door for them to issue a certificate set to your keybag without your permission but that would be a can of worms for them, I'm actually comforted by the fact that they'd much prefer to keep end-to-end encryption for their own liability.
    - nwh 13y ago
      I wouldn't for a second trust that Apple /doesn't/ have the ability to do this.

by nwh 13y ago

danielsju6 13y ago

Actually the devices share a key bag, the popup notifying you when other devices are using your iMessage information comes up during this exchange. The fact that the messages don't immediately show up on other devices and can be out of order speaks to this P2P cryptographic style. You can search for analysis of their protocol, I've done some dissection and it's pretty solid.

smackfu 13y ago
How does this address the concern though? Since a user only needs a password to access past sent messages, the security is only as strong as that password... and Apple can pretty easily circumvent any password related security since they are the ones verifying it.
- danielsju6 13y ago
  True, you only need your password to issue a new key set to the keybag; you can actually monitor the protocol for devices that are distributed your decryption keys (including Apple if they were spying) and you get a popup on each device alerting you to this. It is possible Apple could create a back door for them to issue a certificate set to your keybag without your permission but that would be a can of worms for them, I'm actually comforted by the fact that they'd much prefer to keep end-to-end encryption for their own liability.
  - nwh 13y ago
    I wouldn't for a second trust that Apple /doesn't/ have the ability to do this.