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Hmm, if they are encrypted with your password and Apple does only store hash of that password for login and encrupted messages then everything is ok? I assume t

by atirip 13y ago

Hmm, if they are encrypted with your password and Apple does only store hash of that password for login and encrupted messages then everything is ok? I assume that when you change your iCloud password, the old messages are not visible anymore. Anybody to verify that?

__alexs 13y ago
Given that you send your password in platin text to Apple whenever you login this does not seem like a particularly interception resistant protocol. Apple just need to wait until you login again and then send the encrypted data, and your password to the intelligence services?
- morgante 13y ago
  Do we know that they send your password in plain text?
  - nknighthb 13y ago
    For all intents and purposes, they must, at least when you login via a web browser.
    - morgante 13y ago
      Not technically. You can do client-side encryption so that only the hash is sent, via Javascript.
nknighthb 13y ago
> I assume that when you change your iCloud password, the old messages are not visible anymore. I'm not sure why that would be true. I posit that such a system could work like this: * An asymmetric keypair (e.g. RSA or ECC) is generated and stored on Apple's servers. The private key is encrypted with the user's password, which is not retained by Apple except in a hashed form. * When a device is added, the private key is decrypted using the password and sent to the device. * When your password is changed, either A) the private key is decrypted with the original password, and re-encrypted with the new password, or B) the private key is decrypted, used to decrypt all data, thrown away, and a new keypair is generated, with which all data is then re-encrypted. It is, of course, obvious that Apple could, in theory, capture your plaintext password somewhere in there and use it to decrypt messages. There are ways around this, such as devices doing the key decryption locally and only ever sending a derived/hashed form of your password to the server, and using a different derived/hashed form for encryption. However, since you can log in to iCloud and Apple's store with your Apple ID in a browser, there is still no effective defense against Apple capturing your plaintext password (unless you care to perform a detailed inspection of a bunch of JavaScript every single time you load any content from Apple's servers).
- ninjay 13y ago
  > The private key is encrypted with the user's password, which is not retained by Apple except in a hashed form. > the private key is decrypted using the password and sent to the device. wait, where is this private key coming from then? your other devices?
  - nknighthb 13y ago
    Either Apple would generate it server-side, or the first device to "sign up" would generate it. Remember, I'm only explaining a hypothetical method by which the Apple system could work, consistent with Apple's statements and behavior I've observed from my iPhones, iPads, and Macs. It's not an explanation of a strictly secure system.
    - ninjay 13y ago
      > would generate it. where is it stored though?
      - rdouble 13y ago
        in the Keychain
        ninjay 13y ago
        sigh
        nknighthb 13y ago
        Did you fundamentally misinterpret my sentence? The password is not retained by Apple, the private key is retained, in encrypted form.
- atirip 13y ago
  But this is totally different thing. One is what some company stores by their IT design and then what some agency can require of that data. Second is whether some agency can force/ask some company to do more, to do active spying by that agency spec. So for example, if company X does not log locations, can NSA force them to start doing that? What else can NSA by law force private company X to do? Can they for example force CEO to stalk user Y by foot? If they can not do that, how can they force to develop IT-systems to do that? So when NSA ask to turn location tracking on, and company Y refuses, then what? CEO goes to jail?

by atirip 13y ago

__alexs 13y ago

Given that you send your password in platin text to Apple whenever you login this does not seem like a particularly interception resistant protocol. Apple just need to wait until you login again and then send the encrypted data, and your password to the intelligence services?

morgante 13y ago
Do we know that they send your password in plain text?
- nknighthb 13y ago
  For all intents and purposes, they must, at least when you login via a web browser.
  - morgante 13y ago
    Not technically. You can do client-side encryption so that only the hash is sent, via Javascript.

nknighthb 13y ago

> I assume that when you change your iCloud password, the old messages are not visible anymore. I'm not sure why that would be true. I posit that such a system could work like this: * An asymmetric keypair (e.g. RSA or ECC) is generated and stored on Apple's servers. The private key is encrypted with the user's password, which is not retained by Apple except in a hashed form. * When a device is added, the private key is decrypted using the password and sent to the device. * When your password is changed, either A) the private key is decrypted with the original password, and re-encrypted with the new password, or B) the private key is decrypted, used to decrypt all data, thrown away, and a new keypair is generated, with which all data is then re-encrypted. It is, of course, obvious that Apple could, in theory, capture your plaintext password somewhere in there and use it to decrypt messages. There are ways around this, such as devices doing the key decryption locally and only ever sending a derived/hashed form of your password to the server, and using a different derived/hashed form for encryption. However, since you can log in to iCloud and Apple's store with your Apple ID in a browser, there is still no effective defense against Apple capturing your plaintext password (unless you care to perform a detailed inspection of a bunch of JavaScript every single time you load any content from Apple's servers).

ninjay 13y ago
> The private key is encrypted with the user's password, which is not retained by Apple except in a hashed form. > the private key is decrypted using the password and sent to the device. wait, where is this private key coming from then? your other devices?
- nknighthb 13y ago
  Either Apple would generate it server-side, or the first device to "sign up" would generate it. Remember, I'm only explaining a hypothetical method by which the Apple system could work, consistent with Apple's statements and behavior I've observed from my iPhones, iPads, and Macs. It's not an explanation of a strictly secure system.
  - ninjay 13y ago
    > would generate it. where is it stored though?
    - rdouble 13y ago
      in the Keychain
      - ninjay 13y ago
        sigh
        nknighthb 13y ago
        Did you fundamentally misinterpret my sentence? The password is not retained by Apple, the private key is retained, in encrypted form.
atirip 13y ago
But this is totally different thing. One is what some company stores by their IT design and then what some agency can require of that data. Second is whether some agency can force/ask some company to do more, to do active spying by that agency spec. So for example, if company X does not log locations, can NSA force them to start doing that? What else can NSA by law force private company X to do? Can they for example force CEO to stalk user Y by foot? If they can not do that, how can they force to develop IT-systems to do that? So when NSA ask to turn location tracking on, and company Y refuses, then what? CEO goes to jail?