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what you say is false, EO12333 expressly forbids this with the following: "2.12 Indirect Participation. No element of the Intelligence Community shall partici

by munin 13y ago

what you say is false, EO12333 expressly forbids this with the following: "2.12 Indirect Participation. No element of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order. "

marshray 13y ago
Where in EO12333 does it forbid spying on Americans?
- dllthomas 13y ago
  I'd have to read it closer than I have to figure out what it means, but section 2.4 seems relevant: Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United States or directed against United States persons abroad. Agencies are not authorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented physical search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring devices unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights and limit use of such information to lawful governmental purposes. These procedures shall not authorize: (a) The CIA to engage in electronic surveillance within the United States except for the purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to hostile electronic surveillance; (b) Unconsented physical searches in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for: (1) Searches by counterintelligence elements of the military services directed against military personnel within the United States or abroad for intelligence purposes, when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes, based upon a finding of probable cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers; and (2) Searches by CIA of personal property of non-United States persons lawfully in its possession. (c) Physical surveillance of a United States person in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for: (1) Physical surveillance of present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their present of former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting; and (2) Physical surveillance of a military person employed by a nonintelligence element of a military service. (d) Physical surveillance of a United States person abroad to collect foreign intelligence, except to obtain significant information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means
  - btilly 13y ago
    It all is in how you interpret it. Nothing in PRISM involves physical surveillance, therefore b, c, and d are trivially satisfied. Surveillance by foreign intelligence agencies is in no way surveillance by the CIA, so a is satisfied. There is no noticeable user impact at all, which satisfies "least intrusive". PRISM is, in accord with the law, established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. There are procedures in place to protect constitutional and other rights. In the legal reality supported by the last several administrations, section 2.4 is completely satisfied by turning over US data wholesale to foreign countries, who are then free to use it to spy on US citizens.

by munin 13y ago

marshray 13y ago

Where in EO12333 does it forbid spying on Americans?

dllthomas 13y ago
I'd have to read it closer than I have to figure out what it means, but section 2.4 seems relevant: Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United States or directed against United States persons abroad. Agencies are not authorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented physical search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring devices unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights and limit use of such information to lawful governmental purposes. These procedures shall not authorize: (a) The CIA to engage in electronic surveillance within the United States except for the purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to hostile electronic surveillance; (b) Unconsented physical searches in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for: (1) Searches by counterintelligence elements of the military services directed against military personnel within the United States or abroad for intelligence purposes, when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes, based upon a finding of probable cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers; and (2) Searches by CIA of personal property of non-United States persons lawfully in its possession. (c) Physical surveillance of a United States person in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for: (1) Physical surveillance of present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their present of former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting; and (2) Physical surveillance of a military person employed by a nonintelligence element of a military service. (d) Physical surveillance of a United States person abroad to collect foreign intelligence, except to obtain significant information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means
- btilly 13y ago
  It all is in how you interpret it. Nothing in PRISM involves physical surveillance, therefore b, c, and d are trivially satisfied. Surveillance by foreign intelligence agencies is in no way surveillance by the CIA, so a is satisfied. There is no noticeable user impact at all, which satisfies "least intrusive". PRISM is, in accord with the law, established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. There are procedures in place to protect constitutional and other rights. In the legal reality supported by the last several administrations, section 2.4 is completely satisfied by turning over US data wholesale to foreign countries, who are then free to use it to spy on US citizens.