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Do you think maybe you could, by sending enough foreign-language spam, push the algorithmic determination of foreignness over 51%? How about if another ally al
by gojomo 13y ago
Do you think maybe you could, by sending enough foreign-language spam, push the algorithmic determination of foreignness over 51%?
How about if another ally already possesses or 0wnz another 'hot' (suspicious/tracked) phone, and uses that phone to call another phone of interest, to increase its 'taint'?
I'm also struck by how much this article's description of the progressive process of peeking at already-collected communications using a variety of permissions resembles my speculative interpretation of a few days ago:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5872125 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5872125
- brown9-2 13y agoWhy would you want to do this? And how would you know which addresses are being targeted? And if you could do this on a large scale, what makes you think it would go undetected?
- gojomo 13y agoYou would want to try this because there are often large benefits from surveilling the totality of a person's communications. Those benefits to the surveillor might be professional, personal, financial, or political. And as liberal as the standards for spying apparently are, sometimes the limits are constraining... so hacks like these would effectively remove the limits. Not sure I understand your second question. I wouldn't know how much such abusive targeting might happen; that's the concern about it happening in secret with only "trust us"/"scout's honor" review. Why would it have to go on at a 'large scale'? Even a few incidents of this being used to gather dirt on political opponents, or collect financially-enriching inside information, would be too much, and very dangerous. The value of being able to do this sort of thing is so large, abusers could potentially shield themselves from, or corrupt, the entities which are supposed to detect misuse.