7 ms·
"How much are you willing to bet they can't decrypt https?" I'd bet quite a bit, though not "my life", that they do not have a generalized "read everything" ab
by jerf 13y ago
"How much are you willing to bet they can't decrypt https?"
I'd bet quite a bit, though not "my life", that they do not have a generalized "read everything" ability for all forms of SSL. They may have what cryptographers would call "a crack", but that's a low bar, and doesn't prove they have a practical attack.
However, DDG is currently using 128-bit RC4, which is very weak. [1] I wouldn't care to bet anything that the NSA doesn't have an RC4 cipher crack that is practical to run on wide swathes of traffic.
RC4 is very popular, which I believe is because some people claimed it was a defense against the BEAST attack. I researched this for work, and I couldn't find anyone whom I trusted saying that was a good mitigation. The people I trusted merely observed that RC4 was not vulnerable, but never said you should switch to it. Only secondary sources ever suggested that. My conclusion was that there was a reason for the primary sources never suggesting that; in response to a theoretical break of the rest of SSL, the correct move was not to move to a solution that had much more practical attacks already known than what BEAST demonstrated. But now it's even sillier; BEAST has been either entirely or almost entirely mitigated in browsers (there's no server-side defense against BEAST, but there's a client-side one you can use, and browsers now have it). As far as I can tell, RC4 should be abandoned and we should resume using stronger ciphers for SSL. Anyone still concerned about BEAST should update their browser.
[1]: http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/03/16/has-https-finally-been-cracked/ http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/03/16/has-https-finally...
- dllthomas 13y agoI might bet my life on HTTPS depending on what my alternate choices are. I'm loathe to bet my life on anything, though.
- icebraining 13y agoOTOH, if they can get a CA - any CA - to cooperate, they can MITM anyone without having to break SSL.
- nwh 13y agoOnly for targeted traffic though. They can't record, go back, and break it.
- sirclueless 13y agoNot without someone noticing. Some sites have pinned certs in Chrome, which would stop this, and even without that you would expect some knowledgeable techie at Facebook or Github or something to be using their home laptop and say, "Wait a sec, this isn't my company's public cert!" Not having seen any blog posts screaming, "OMG, my site is being hijacked wholesale," I can only assume that the NSA isn't doing this (or has managed to squelch by legal order every single person privy to the real cert at MITM'ed sites, which is absurd and would beg the question, why not obtain the private key from these people in a similar way?).
- wisty 13y agoCould they do this selectively, and only MITM people on watchlists?
- bigiain 13y agoThey have to set up impersonating SSL certs for every connection they want to MITM. While there'd clearly be value in them inserting or subverting network hops between "the great unwashed" and gmail/facebook/aim servers, there's very little chance the NSA have access to hops along the path between my (Australian) adsl connection and my vps (located in Australia). For internal (or routed through) US traffic - while Verizon's lack of interest in protecting customer data is probably shared by major backbone providers - I _strongly_ doubt even the NSA has enough gear hanging off backbones to actively MITM any significant proportion of the firehose that'd represent. Even the AT&T "secret room" probably doesn't house enough gear to be able to create fake(signed)certs and MITM every SSL connection for millions or more simultaneous users browsing every https site under the sun. Having said that, I'd bet good money the _do_ target specific SSL traffic - has anyone checked the SSL connections to TOR entry and exit points recently? That'd be one spectacularly obvious path to try "speculative MITM attacks".
- Sami_Lehtinen 13y agoThis is why I tell people that actual fingerprint check is much better than any CA.
- icebraining 13y agoYes, but how do you get the fingerprint to check against?
- erhardm 13y agoI assume he also implies that fingerprints aren't any safer
- icebraining 13y agoWho?
- jlgaddis 13y agoThe EFF's "HTTPS Everywhere" extension is a great place to start. https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere
- lessnonymous 13y agoDo they need to MITM? If they have a copy of the private key, can't they just use it to decrypt the data .. even old data for which they've only just acquired the key?
- soitgoes 13y agoHaving the root CA's private key doesn't give them access to the end entity's private keys. When you ask a CA for a cert, you only provide them with your public key (in the form of a CSR) for them to sign. The CSR does not contain the private key.
- mtrimpe 13y agoBut getting an employee to hand over the private key and giving him a gag order afterwards is an option of course.
- meowface 13y agoTrue, but they would have to do this for every single web server they would want to collect information from. Not impossible, but it'd be a lot of work.
- pilsetnieks 13y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECDHE https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECDHE Google is using it, a few other sites, too, though they are in the minority. OpenSSL supports it since version 1.0.0 that was released in March 2010.
- mh- 13y agoto your latter question: no, not with the right ciphers. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy
- jrockway 13y ago
- jaryd 13y agoThanks for pointing this out. I'm looking into updating our ciphers very soon.
- jerf 13y agoHeh, I was wondering if that might get noticed. :) On the one hand, don't take my word for it; I also have not found anyone I trust who has verified my explanation directly. On the other hand, I did do my best to read the primary sources very carefully, both for what they say and what they don't say, and I was confident enough to implement more conventionally strong ciphers on the services I'm responsible for, so my money is where my metaphorical mouth is.
- abrichr 13y agoThanks for the link, that was an awesome article. Well written and technically substantial. How did you come across it?
- jerf 13y agoI googled for something like "rc4 weak crack" or something like that. I was just trying to substantiate the claim that RC4 is weak.