4 ms·

Theoretically, one can see all the transactions of Kenya right?

by jjsz 13y ago

clarkmoody 13y ago
If one did the work to determine which addresses were used in Kenyan transactions, then one would have this record. All transactions are public, but addresses are pseudonymous.
- jjsz 13y ago
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5872417 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5872417
jdreaver 13y ago
Indeed, Bitcoin offers just pseudo-anonymity. However, if you are very disciplined, you can severely limit or even totally remove the possibility of someone linking you to your Bitcoins. No one even needs to know a transaction happened in Kenya.
- stinkytaco 13y ago
  >However, if you are very disciplined, you can severely limit or even totally remove the possibility of someone linking you to your Bitcoins. I'm curious how you might do this? Basically you must be able to hide the fact that you own an address, correct? Does that mean using different addresses for handling transactions while updating the block chain from different IPs (in different physical locations, just so your phone or simple general geographic pattern doesn't reveal you)? Is there something I might be missing?
  - tocomment 13y ago
    I've also thought you could use private keys much like cash. That would be completely anonymous. The payee would just check the balance of the associated public key before the transaction and immediately transfer the balance after the transaction.
  - jdreaver 13y ago
    You are correct. Additionally, you could split large transactions into multiple destination addresses or obfuscate them with intermediary addresses. It takes longer to verify transactions, but it's harder to tie addresses to a single entity (you). Another problem you hint at is broadcasting a transaction from certain IPs. A common heuristic is to record the IP of the first node to report a transaction as the node that made the transaction. You would have to modify your client so that is not the case, or use some sort of VPN to connect to the network.
  - sliverstorm 13y ago
    IMO the best and only way to do this is to focus on the entry and exit of funds from the bitcoin cloud. As soon as one address can be tied to you, all your other accounts can be tied to you, no matter how many games you play with multiple addresses and shuffling coins around. If you want to know how to achieve this, look to modern money laundering practices.
    - stinkytaco 13y ago
      Perhaps the word I should have used is "private key" rather than "address". There's no reason I couldn't have a dozen private keys and wallets that I use in different locations for different reasons. As long as that private key can't be tied to me personally (i.e. by protecting my identity during transactions, transacting in varying locations from varying IPs, etc.) it should be anonymous. That would make the protocol useless for day to day transactions like buying groceries, but at least as anonymous as cash for more sensitive transactions.
      - sliverstorm 13y ago
        But see, the private key has to be funded! Unless people start exchanging private keys instead of bitcoins, and never transfer money in and out of the wallet, there will still be a trail. Exchanging private keys is fraught with peril- the originator doesn't lose knowledge of what the key was when they give it to you. The only way to make it work safely is to immediately transfer funds out of the key you just received (to ensure the originator doesn't pull the funds before you can use them), and then we are back to having a trail. As far as someone following that trail is concerned, it is just an extra "hop"- the money still flowed from IllegalVendorA to <unknown> to You. You can certainly try to obfuscate things, but the point is all the data is there and always will be, and even if it seems like a human wouldn't be able to figure it out, computers are very good at working through graphs!
- jjsz 13y ago
  So, again, theoretically: if one were to infiltrate Kenya, capture commercial wallets, link their prices with objects, one can create a network of consumers and a decent amount of data from the transactions. Introducing Kenya, or any developing country, to Bitcoin can be used as a way to gather insight on markets- perfect for knowing what products to advertise- with this I came to the conclusion that distributed-public-pseudoanonymity allows anyone to monitor markets in real time when you know commercial wallets and their menu / items that they're selling. Is this legal?

Theoretically, one can see all the transactions of Kenya right?

by jjsz 13y ago

Theoretically, one can see all the transactions of Kenya right?

If one did the work to determine which addresses were used in Kenyan transactions, then one would have this record. All transactions are public, but addresses are pseudonymous.

jjsz 13y ago
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5872417 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5872417

jdreaver 13y ago

Indeed, Bitcoin offers just pseudo-anonymity. However, if you are very disciplined, you can severely limit or even totally remove the possibility of someone linking you to your Bitcoins. No one even needs to know a transaction happened in Kenya.

stinkytaco 13y ago
>However, if you are very disciplined, you can severely limit or even totally remove the possibility of someone linking you to your Bitcoins. I'm curious how you might do this? Basically you must be able to hide the fact that you own an address, correct? Does that mean using different addresses for handling transactions while updating the block chain from different IPs (in different physical locations, just so your phone or simple general geographic pattern doesn't reveal you)? Is there something I might be missing?
- tocomment 13y ago
  I've also thought you could use private keys much like cash. That would be completely anonymous. The payee would just check the balance of the associated public key before the transaction and immediately transfer the balance after the transaction.
- jdreaver 13y ago
  You are correct. Additionally, you could split large transactions into multiple destination addresses or obfuscate them with intermediary addresses. It takes longer to verify transactions, but it's harder to tie addresses to a single entity (you). Another problem you hint at is broadcasting a transaction from certain IPs. A common heuristic is to record the IP of the first node to report a transaction as the node that made the transaction. You would have to modify your client so that is not the case, or use some sort of VPN to connect to the network.
- sliverstorm 13y ago
  IMO the best and only way to do this is to focus on the entry and exit of funds from the bitcoin cloud. As soon as one address can be tied to you, all your other accounts can be tied to you, no matter how many games you play with multiple addresses and shuffling coins around. If you want to know how to achieve this, look to modern money laundering practices.
  - stinkytaco 13y ago
    Perhaps the word I should have used is "private key" rather than "address". There's no reason I couldn't have a dozen private keys and wallets that I use in different locations for different reasons. As long as that private key can't be tied to me personally (i.e. by protecting my identity during transactions, transacting in varying locations from varying IPs, etc.) it should be anonymous. That would make the protocol useless for day to day transactions like buying groceries, but at least as anonymous as cash for more sensitive transactions.
    - sliverstorm 13y ago
      But see, the private key has to be funded! Unless people start exchanging private keys instead of bitcoins, and never transfer money in and out of the wallet, there will still be a trail. Exchanging private keys is fraught with peril- the originator doesn't lose knowledge of what the key was when they give it to you. The only way to make it work safely is to immediately transfer funds out of the key you just received (to ensure the originator doesn't pull the funds before you can use them), and then we are back to having a trail. As far as someone following that trail is concerned, it is just an extra "hop"- the money still flowed from IllegalVendorA to <unknown> to You. You can certainly try to obfuscate things, but the point is all the data is there and always will be, and even if it seems like a human wouldn't be able to figure it out, computers are very good at working through graphs!
jjsz 13y ago
So, again, theoretically: if one were to infiltrate Kenya, capture commercial wallets, link their prices with objects, one can create a network of consumers and a decent amount of data from the transactions. Introducing Kenya, or any developing country, to Bitcoin can be used as a way to gather insight on markets- perfect for knowing what products to advertise- with this I came to the conclusion that distributed-public-pseudoanonymity allows anyone to monitor markets in real time when you know commercial wallets and their menu / items that they're selling. Is this legal?