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>'oh by the way, I carefully chose specific things to leak as I didn't want to risk national security, I just want to help my country' That's an interesting qu

• mpyne 13y ago
  And if he actually looked at and carefully reviewed all of those (which is possible after 3 months at the NSA) then his point would still apply, would it not? Manning, on the other hand, leaked too much: "his review of leaked Afghanistan and Iraq battlefield reports revealed techniques for neutralizing improvised explosives, the name of an enemy target, the names of criminal suspects and troop movements". [1] Does explaining how the U.S. Army was neutralizing IEDs so that Taliban could work around those methods and continue to kill and maim Afghan civilians, children, and ISAF soldiers really help you as a citizen? How many families died from roadside bombs that were designed to avoid these neutralization methods thanks to Manning's leaks? Are you sure the answer is 0? But again, this is what I mean by tribalism. You try to discredit Snowden's own point since Manning is in the tribe. Does it even occur to you that it's possible Manning could have gone overboard in his goal for transparency? That he could have done 1 thing wrong and 999 things right? [1] http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130611/NEWS06/306110044 http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130611/NEWS06/306110044
  • aspensmonster 13y ago
    >...then his point would still apply, would it not? Impossible to say. He couldn't know for certain that none of the data could harm national security any more than Manning could. They both could have "gone overboard" in their push for transparency, though you could guess I'd argue neither of them did, and that far more right than wrong has resulted from their actions. Things like "the name of an enemy target, the names of criminal suspects, and troop movements" aren't exactly actionable years after the fact and are likely already available to the enemy. Methods for diffusing IEDs are the only substantially problematic item in that list, though something tells me that the insurgents were already quite adept at that cat and mouse game, preferring IEDs to open encounters since at least 2006 [1]. That doesn't make it right. It just makes it "1 thing wrong" amidst an ocean of data that revealed the true extent of the wars and just how badly they were going. It was the raw proof needed to document that the Taliban and other anti-coalition actors were dealing out just as much death and destruction on their own people as the coalition, if not more so (in Afghanistan at least, _substantially_ more so). And yet the natives of the areas were still largely unable to form a unified political, social, and military response to address the sectarian violence within their own ranks. If that isn't evidence for a failed intervention in areas steeped in historical sectarianism that we needn't be involved with any longer, I don't know what else is. I'm very interested in knowing about the supposed "dozens" of other compromises the Navy Times mentions: >"For the first time, prosecutors presented evidence that the disclosures compromised sensitive information in dozens of categories." However, getting information out of the proceedings has been a battle all its own. We've had to fight tooth and nail to even get a _typewriter_ into a separate media room, and it's looking like this is the only public record that will ever exist on the matter. Those journalistic organizations that have gained access to the proceedings were forced to sign documents agreeing to not release certain information in exchange for the privilege of attending. And it wouldn't surprise me if most of those "dozens" of bits of evidence are all locked up in off-site locations away from the proceedings, making it difficult if not impossible to reliably fact check and cross-examine potential witnesses during trial. [1] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/25/ieds-improvised-explosive-device-deaths http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/25/ieds-improvised-...