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What is it about hashes? Every single one gets broken eventually. Encryption doesn't seem to suffer from this - the keyspace might be small enough to search, b
by ars 18y ago
What is it about hashes? Every single one gets broken eventually.
Encryption doesn't seem to suffer from this - the keyspace might be small enough to search, but they don't get broken.
2^52 isn't small, but it's a lot less than the expected 2^80.
- cperciva 18y agoEncryption doesn't seem to suffer from this - the keyspace might be small enough to search, but they don't get broken. DES is vulnerable to linear cryptanalysis (2^43 plaintexts). RC2 is vulnerable to a related-key attack (2^34 chosen plaintexts). RC4 is broken in too many ways to list. Khufu and Khafre are subject to differential cryptanalysis.
- tptacek 18y agoDES, RC2, RC4, Khufu, Khafre. Now can we get an analysis for something that isn't in the "don't ever use" list in Practical Cryptography? Because it is the case that hashes are less well studied (and thus possibly less "hardened") than our workhorse block ciphers. You're the expert here, can we wheedle you into giving us the real answer?
- cperciva 18y agoDES, RC2, RC4, Khufu, Khafre. Now can we get an analysis for something that isn't in the "don't ever use" list in Practical Cryptography? I wasn't aware there was such a list... but if those were on a "don't ever use" list, I'd expect MD5 and SHA1 to be on the same list. Because it is the case that hashes are less well studied (and thus possibly less "hardened") than our workhorse block ciphers. Historically speaking, yes. If you stop a random man on the street and ask him what cryptography it, he's far more likely to say "keeping secrets" than "unforgeable authentication". Cryptographers have known for a long time that authentication is important, but because of the public bias towards secrecy, encryption has tended to receive more attention than authentication. I don't think this is the case any more, however -- with these recent attacks I'd say that the state of the art of attacks on hashes is roughly on par with the state of the art of attacks on block ciphers.
- evgen 18y agoIt is also worth noting that historically hash functions have had the implicit requirement of being "fast" and "small". Because hashes are used on both encrypted and unencrypted data there is a pressure on hash designers and the people selecting from available hash options to factor speed and output hash size into the selection criteria. This inevitably leads to the selection of hash functions that compromise security for other (practical) considerations. We could have moved from MD5 to Whirlpool a long time ago, but I and everyone else looked at doubling storage requirements and chopping throughput to a trickle and selected SHA1...
- gms 18y agoIt's not that. People just know so little about designing good crypto hash functions. Basically right now nobody knows what they're doing.
- cperciva 18y agoBasically right now nobody knows what they're doing. That's going a bit far. We know how to design hashes which are provably at least as strong as block ciphers (i.e., "if you can break this hash, you can break AES") -- but synthetic constructions like those always end up being much slower than constructions which are "native" hashes.
- tptacek 18y agoI don't know why someone would mod this comment down. It paraphrases pretty accurately points made by professional cryptographers. Percival's response is also accurate. He's saying, there's a baseline for secure hash functions: those that adapt block cipher constructions. But that's just the baseline. Nobody does that, because hash functions need to be fast. And making that tradeoff of speed versus proven constructions seems to put us into the weeds.
- ars 18y agoSo is that my answer to the question that started this thread? We know how to make good hashes, but they are slow. And all the fast hashes get broken eventually?