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>If a company does not cooperate, an agent 'activated' who has access to the information of the company. "Within businesses and institutions everywhere activate

>If a company does not cooperate, an agent 'activated' who has access to the information of the company. "Within businesses and institutions everywhere activate waiting for a request for information. Agents are" In other words: the problem may be as much the fact that personal data exists in the hands of third parties at all as it is that there's any formal framework that enables law enforcement/national security agencies to legally access it.

DannoHung 13y ago
I was trying to get this across to a few people in various forums. The mere fact that data is gathered in places allows and ultimately engenders its exploitation. You can't fix the laws. You have to fix the humans somehow. Or write systems that, by construction (as in, a lot of research into dependent type systems where a "bad" program cannot be compiled) do not allow data to be abused.
cromwellian 13y ago
I find the claims that moles within Google are responsible for this, to be, not impossible, but very improbable. The way Google's internal employee network is setup, the way the code reviews work, the way automated security audits work, the way the data is stored, there are lots of checks and balances that would make it hard to pull off without being noticed. It's not like an employee can just hack in a device onto the network and start committing code with backdoors, putting trojans on servers, or slurping up network packets.
- babuskov 13y ago
  I find that you underestimate the training of top undercover agents.
  - cromwellian 13y ago
    It's not really a matter of them fooling their co-workers. The access just isn't there, not to mention intensive logging and cross-checking. Google isn't your run of the mill web application where the Sysadmin/DBA is god.
  - twistedpair 13y ago
    But could they get through the coding interviews?
  - bilbo0s 13y ago
    You underestimate the training of your average Stanford CS grad.
    - babuskov 13y ago
      Who says that some of top Stanford CS grads are not working as undercover agents. The way secret services are shown in movies is a little bit different than the real world. All of them recruit top students from different universities. There is no "university for spies", where they teach agents all the skills they need to get the job somewhere. It's the other way around: they recruit people who already have those skills and teach them how to be agents. That's much easier because teaching someone how to become agent is their expertise.
      - bilbo0s 13y ago
        "...Who says that some of top Stanford CS grads are not working as undercover agents..." Some of them may be... but the others will undoubtedly spot what's going on. These guys are not dull. They REALLY ARE the smartest guys in the room.
- rvschuilenburg 13y ago
  What happened here then? http://gawker.com/5637234/gcreep-google-engineer-stalked-teens-spied-on-chats http://gawker.com/5637234/gcreep-google-engineer-stalked-tee...
  - uncommon 13y ago
    Aurora [1] helped a lot to make stuff even more secure internally. They care a lot about privacy as once that's gone they'd see their users gone. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora
  - cromwellian 13y ago
    Check the date, it's before the China attacks.
    - blauwbilgorgel 13y ago
      So internal security has been ramped up after the China attacks. How? In part: On 4 February 2010, the Washington Post reported, “Google approached the NSA shortly after the attacks, sources said, but the deal is taking weeks to hammer out, reflecting the sensitivity of the partnership. Any agreement would mark the first time that Google has entered a formal information-sharing relationship with the NSA.” EPIC rapidly submitted a Freedom of Information request to the NSA requesting any documents pertaining to this NSA/Google relationship. The NSA’s response was Glomar – a refusal to confirm or deny that any records exist. So while rogue employees might become less likely, rogue (NSA) agents hardly become less likely. I totally get it though: Security and operations at the largest search engine in the world is a matter of national security. I think this new Google-NSA relationship is inevitable, though it could be a bit more transparent.
      - cromwellian 13y ago
        It is unlikely Google was asking the NSA to help secure their data-centers, it is more likely that Google was sharing information on the attacks and asking if the NSA had any corroborating evidence about it's source in the People's Liberation Army. When tech companies face a coordinated foreign attack like this, they are looking to share attack data with one another, as well as the government, in order to form a complete picture of the attacker. Let's put it this way. I could let you sit at my desk, give you my password, even let you edit code and try to submit it, and you would not be able to do anything harmful except perhaps get some of my personal data off my own hard disk. I'd even let you install a keylogger and it wouldn't help. You might be able to see internal design docs of unreleased Google products, but you would not be able to invade user privacy. That ship has sailed.

DannoHung 13y ago

I was trying to get this across to a few people in various forums. The mere fact that data is gathered in places allows and ultimately engenders its exploitation. You can't fix the laws. You have to fix the humans somehow. Or write systems that, by construction (as in, a lot of research into dependent type systems where a "bad" program cannot be compiled) do not allow data to be abused.

cromwellian 13y ago

I find the claims that moles within Google are responsible for this, to be, not impossible, but very improbable. The way Google's internal employee network is setup, the way the code reviews work, the way automated security audits work, the way the data is stored, there are lots of checks and balances that would make it hard to pull off without being noticed. It's not like an employee can just hack in a device onto the network and start committing code with backdoors, putting trojans on servers, or slurping up network packets.

babuskov 13y ago
I find that you underestimate the training of top undercover agents.
- cromwellian 13y ago
  It's not really a matter of them fooling their co-workers. The access just isn't there, not to mention intensive logging and cross-checking. Google isn't your run of the mill web application where the Sysadmin/DBA is god.
- twistedpair 13y ago
  But could they get through the coding interviews?
- bilbo0s 13y ago
  You underestimate the training of your average Stanford CS grad.
  - babuskov 13y ago
    Who says that some of top Stanford CS grads are not working as undercover agents. The way secret services are shown in movies is a little bit different than the real world. All of them recruit top students from different universities. There is no "university for spies", where they teach agents all the skills they need to get the job somewhere. It's the other way around: they recruit people who already have those skills and teach them how to be agents. That's much easier because teaching someone how to become agent is their expertise.
    - bilbo0s 13y ago
      "...Who says that some of top Stanford CS grads are not working as undercover agents..." Some of them may be... but the others will undoubtedly spot what's going on. These guys are not dull. They REALLY ARE the smartest guys in the room.
rvschuilenburg 13y ago
What happened here then? http://gawker.com/5637234/gcreep-google-engineer-stalked-teens-spied-on-chats http://gawker.com/5637234/gcreep-google-engineer-stalked-tee...
- uncommon 13y ago
  Aurora [1] helped a lot to make stuff even more secure internally. They care a lot about privacy as once that's gone they'd see their users gone. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora
- cromwellian 13y ago
  Check the date, it's before the China attacks.
  - blauwbilgorgel 13y ago
    So internal security has been ramped up after the China attacks. How? In part: On 4 February 2010, the Washington Post reported, “Google approached the NSA shortly after the attacks, sources said, but the deal is taking weeks to hammer out, reflecting the sensitivity of the partnership. Any agreement would mark the first time that Google has entered a formal information-sharing relationship with the NSA.” EPIC rapidly submitted a Freedom of Information request to the NSA requesting any documents pertaining to this NSA/Google relationship. The NSA’s response was Glomar – a refusal to confirm or deny that any records exist. So while rogue employees might become less likely, rogue (NSA) agents hardly become less likely. I totally get it though: Security and operations at the largest search engine in the world is a matter of national security. I think this new Google-NSA relationship is inevitable, though it could be a bit more transparent.
    - cromwellian 13y ago
      It is unlikely Google was asking the NSA to help secure their data-centers, it is more likely that Google was sharing information on the attacks and asking if the NSA had any corroborating evidence about it's source in the People's Liberation Army. When tech companies face a coordinated foreign attack like this, they are looking to share attack data with one another, as well as the government, in order to form a complete picture of the attacker. Let's put it this way. I could let you sit at my desk, give you my password, even let you edit code and try to submit it, and you would not be able to do anything harmful except perhaps get some of my personal data off my own hard disk. I'd even let you install a keylogger and it wouldn't help. You might be able to see internal design docs of unreleased Google products, but you would not be able to invade user privacy. That ship has sailed.