2 ms·
The problem is two-fold. 1. Ensuring that the key belongs to the person you think it does. 2. Graceful changing of keys. In theory you could do something l
by einhverfr 13y ago
The problem is two-fold.
1. Ensuring that the key belongs to the person you think it does.
2. Graceful changing of keys.
In theory you could do something like what I am proposing with GPG too. You could sign a public key with the previous private key or two. In practice, getting the keys to where you want them is a bit more complex.
As a point I made clear in my blog entry, I am not a fan of X509, because the impedance mismatch of anything OSI and TCP/IP is significant. However, it does a decent job, when combined with LDAP (another monster IMHO) of spelling out the general solutions to problems PKI's suffer. It is therefore a useful reference point and probably the best foundation to build a decent proof of concept on.
- XorNot 13y agoI think the problem is the one you're inadvertently recreating here: you're trying to imagine a system which is perfect amongst people who are always in isolation with each other and tries to make keys as perpetual as possible. Consider the alternative: social keying. A system where the expectation is that you'll change keys frequently, taking advantage of day-to-day social interactions and the like to do so. I see a friend, our phones are in proximity - software takes advantage of this and generates and signs a new key. Of course, this is where the whole "metadata" issue really crops up: those awesome secure keys, to work, still timestamp and identify you perfectly.