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Put a better interface on GPG to make managing web-of-trust not a nightmare. The infrastructure has existed for a long time, but using it is amazingly unfriendl
by XorNot 13y ago
Put a better interface on GPG to make managing web-of-trust not a nightmare. The infrastructure has existed for a long time, but using it is amazingly unfriendly.
It gets more interesting when you consider a model like off-the-record encryption, where the goal isn't encryption and verification but deniability. OTR has the great property of ensuring that any time you manage to decrypt or intercept a message, you've also received all the information necessary to forge that message. Identifying keys are transient so you can never really prove any individual, sent any message since if you hold a copy of the message you could just as easily have faked the message.
- eightyone 13y agoI wish there was a site to connect open-source projects who need better UIs with the designers over at Dribbble. On Dribbble you see a lot of UI concepts that never come to fruition. What if we could convince some of them to help build a better PGP UI? After all, real world applications look much better on a resume than concepts.
- gurkendoktor 13y agoWe've tried to write a streamlined UI for GPG keysigning parties in university. The CLI of gpg was absolutely hostile. Fatal errors would still have 0 as the exit code etc... :(
- Torgo 13y agoYou're supposed to link against GPG-ME. It's specifically for that purpose.
- gurkendoktor 13y agoThanks! We apparently all failed at Google at the time. We were using Java but it seems there are wrappers.
- ianstormtaylor 13y agoAs a designer, throughout this entire scandal I've been wishing for the same thing. I assume there are projects out there that I can contribute design thinking to, but I honestly don't know which ones need it or would welcome it.
- indeyets 13y agoGive this one a try: https://gpgtools.org/ https://gpgtools.org/ It is a tool-set which integrates GNUPG into OS X
- justincormack 13y agoGiven Apple signed up to PRISM what's the point? Do you trust OSX?
- mitchty 13y agoDo you trust the asics you're running on? At some point this mode of thinking becomes tautological and neurotic.
- justincormack 13y agoSure but the early adopters for this type of product are probably running Linux...
- einhverfr 13y agoThe problem is two-fold. 1. Ensuring that the key belongs to the person you think it does. 2. Graceful changing of keys. In theory you could do something like what I am proposing with GPG too. You could sign a public key with the previous private key or two. In practice, getting the keys to where you want them is a bit more complex. As a point I made clear in my blog entry, I am not a fan of X509, because the impedance mismatch of anything OSI and TCP/IP is significant. However, it does a decent job, when combined with LDAP (another monster IMHO) of spelling out the general solutions to problems PKI's suffer. It is therefore a useful reference point and probably the best foundation to build a decent proof of concept on.
- XorNot 13y agoI think the problem is the one you're inadvertently recreating here: you're trying to imagine a system which is perfect amongst people who are always in isolation with each other and tries to make keys as perpetual as possible. Consider the alternative: social keying. A system where the expectation is that you'll change keys frequently, taking advantage of day-to-day social interactions and the like to do so. I see a friend, our phones are in proximity - software takes advantage of this and generates and signs a new key. Of course, this is where the whole "metadata" issue really crops up: those awesome secure keys, to work, still timestamp and identify you perfectly.
- noerps 13y agoPutting a better UX or UI has been considered for PGP/GPG a very long time, and if you really reflect on that topic, you'll learn that a fancy interface or UX won't solve anything. Foolproof software is operated by fools. Facebook has only proven that to an extent that you simply can't deny it anymore. If fools use PGP/GPG, they will compromise you by putting the message in the subject and encrypting their disclaimer/footer. OTR uses, iirc, AES and DH-kex, that are the same basic building blocks like RSA and AES or any other symmetric cipher you like to use for PGP/GPG/SSL. OTR adds deniability which is fancy for privacy but won't do for other scenarios (like business, money, profit), it works fine in one to one sessions, but group sessions are off the record. We can conclude that OTR is fine for chat, sorry to hear google dropped the interoperability protocol in hangouts, take a wild guess why. PGP/GPG can sent to group-messages (one message encryped for multiple recipients and may optional provide proof of the sender), does not imply any protocol like XMPP, and stores messags in a secure manner too. The drawback is, you have to take care of your private-key and your friens, partners, business-associates public-keys. If somebody really inists that key management sucks with GPG/PGP let them do some key management and distribution only with a symmetric cipher. Key-Managment with PGP/GPG is a light, soft breeze compared to that. Some people even used it as an excuse to party. I understand why people have dropped privacy and anonmyity, it is no fun to follow procedure and there are so less benefits compared to every other social media app, it is so comfy to state you have nothing to hide and not care about the implications. With PGP/GPG you won't have 600 friends, that means caring about 600 keys, that is basically one revoke a week if you are lucky and all you friends master crypto and revoking and getting their new key signed. If you want to understand a bit crypto it may take a good tutor to teach you the very basic concepts and history of using crypto within 2 schooldays, 16h (and they'll hate you afterwards and they won't pay that).
- einhverfr 13y agoI agree with this, but would also point out that the problems I am addressing though can't be solved by a better user interface. In addition to the issues you describe you also have the question of key infrastructure. Key servers are not adequate as they are, and so IMO you need to have ways of verifying the key is legit, which are not included in the PGP model. That key infrastructure is something which needs to be thought out and made resistant to a single party tampering with things.