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Actually, in a good debate, the fallacies are taken as (Bayesian) evidence, even if obviously imperfect. Appeal to authority/experts: The fact that experts bel
by SilasX 13y ago
Actually, in a good debate, the fallacies are taken as (Bayesian) evidence, even if obviously imperfect.
Appeal to authority/experts: The fact that experts believe something is evidence in favor of it (albeit imperfect and overridable).
Appeal to tradition: The fact that things have historically been done a certain way, in a highly immodular system with complex dependencies, without catastrophic failure is evidence in favor of it (albeit imperfect and overridable).
Appeal/reduction to absurdity: Absurd ideas are usually false, even if the presumption can be overridden.
Genetic fallacy: Actually, the reason a conclusion was reached is exactly how you should judge it. (The true fallacy is thinking that you can pick an arbitrary reason a conclusion was reached -- e.g. snake dreams and Benzene -- rather than the best reason -- the later empirical confirmation of the model's predictive power.)
And so on.
Generally, the "Fallacy fallacy" is to jump from
"Hey, this piece of evidence isn't perfect (i.e. an infinite likelihood ratio, which is impossible anyway)"
to
"So I can ignore it."
- dragonwriter 13y ago> Actually, in a good debate, the fallacies are taken as (Bayesian) evidence, even if obviously imperfect. I don't believe there is any reasonable definition of "good" where this is true. I think this characterization must rest on a misunderstanding of what the fallacies actually are. > Appeal to authority/experts: The fact that experts believe something is evidence in favor of it (albeit imperfect and overridable). Yes, but where that's true its not the fallacy of appeal to authority; the fallacy of appeal to authority is making an appeal to an authority where: 1. The cited authority is not actually an authority in the appropriate domain, or 2. The cited position is not the consensus of experts in the appropriate domain, or 3. In the context of deductive, rather than inductive, argument. (Similar problems exist with your other arguments about fallacies as evidence). Finally, your description of the "fallacy fallacy" is incorrect; it is not the (non-)fallacy of rejecting an argument because it is fallacious, it is the formal fallacy of affirming the negation of a claim because an argument containing a fallacy is offered in support of the claim.
- SilasX 13y ago>In the context of deductive, rather than inductive, argument. The very context that you should never use, in other words, which was exactly my point! If you're going to require all evidence deductively imply a conclusion (i.e. have an infinite likelihood ratio), then you're excluding all real-world evidence, and making the very fallacy I described (which I didn't realize was claimed for something else). So it seems you essentially agree with using the "appeal to authority" fallacy in exactly the way I warned against. And that you generally endorse (the genuine fallacy of) rejecting evidence simply because it doesn't guarantee a conclusion. Whatever it is, that's not good debate, I'm afraid.
- dragonwriter 13y ago> The very context that you should never use, in other words No, that's not other words for what I said. > which was exactly my point! Yes, that you should never use deductive reasoning was one of your points (and a ludicrous one). No, that point isn't an "in other words" of anything in my response. > If you're going to require all evidence deductively imply a conclusion Having some contexts within which deductive reasoning is used (what you are arguing against categorically) is not equivalent to requiring all evidence to deductively imply a conclusion. This is the fallacy of the excluded middle, arguing that if you aren't exclusively using inductive reasoning, then you must be exclusively using deductive reasoning. > (i.e. have an infinite likelihood ratio) Deductive implication isn't equivalent to having an "infinite likelihood ratio". First, because deductive reasoning is about necessary (logical) rather than probabilistic implication, so talking about likelihood ratios for it is misplaced, and second, because, insofar as it might make sense to talk about a "likelihood ratio" for deductive logic, the ratio would be 1, which is very much finite. > then you're excluding all real-world evidence Well, yeah, real world evidence is prior to a deductive argument, not part of it; insofar as it contributes to a deductive argument, it does so as part of an inductive justification for the premises of a deductive argument. > and making the very fallacy I described (which I didn't realize was claimed for something else). The thing you described is not a fallacy. > So it seems you essentially agree with using the "appeal to authority" fallacy in exactly the way I warned against. You didn't warn against using the appeal to authority fallacy, you endorsed (not "warned against) using something you called the "the appeal to authority fallacy", and then defined that as something that is not what the "appeal to authority fallacy" actually refers to. > And that you generally endorse (the genuine fallacy of) rejecting evidence simply because it doesn't guarantee a conclusion. No, I don't, and nothing in my post stated that, or supports your claim that I endorse that. That's just something you invented.