3 ms·
I really like how readable the overview paper is [1]—I'd recommend reading it if you want to understand what is being proposed here. I especially thought the se
by mrmaddog 13y ago
I really like how readable the overview paper is [1]—I'd recommend reading it if you want to understand what is being proposed here. I especially thought the section on a passive operating mode was interesting. The idea that you can hide an ACK in another message, which is then broadcast to ACK both of the original messages is pretty clever. However, since Bradley's message to Charlie is also broadcast to everyone, wouldn't Eve get the same amount of information as if Bradley had just ack'd the message in the first place?
Anyhow, assuming I misunderstood something, passive listening doesn't seem to work well with their description of stream scalability, since Alice would now think she knows Bradley's stream, when it was actually Charlie's stream. For this to work, I suppose Alice would have to know that Bradley would be a secret listener to begin with.
In any case, it is definitely an interesting read. Seems like the type of thing Julian Assange would love to have. [2]
[1] https://bitmessage.org/bitmessage.pdf https://bitmessage.org/bitmessage.pdf
[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5574589 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5574589
- cantos 13y agoI had a brief look at the paper. I got stuck on the section about scalability. I can't see how that could be implemented so that authentication can be done given that the nodes are untrusted (by which I mean implemented with a much smaller amount of computation and storage than was required in the non-optimized approach).
- Sami_Lehtinen 13y agoTrue, you're going to need gigabytes of memory. My test client used over 6 gigabytes o memry after small inventory injection play. I have a few great ideas how to create efficient propagating attacks, but I haven't yet tried those.
- muyuu 13y agoJust publish the ones you've tried.