4 ms·
They would get quite a few pseudorandom numbers of mine, aside from a self-compiled Linux kernel. :-)
by claudius 13y ago
They would get quite a few pseudorandom numbers of mine, aside from a self-compiled Linux kernel. :-)
- snuxoll 13y ago> aside from a self-compiled Linux kernel. Likely sitting on an unencrypted /boot, waiting to be replaced by one with a keylogger, am I right? Of course a sane person doesn't trust a system that's been compromised before nuking it and reloading from a clean image.
- claudius 13y agoThere is unfortunately relatively little you can do to thwart such an attack, apart from keeping your notebook with you at all/most times. Though using a USB key for /boot might be an idea, it is a little less clunky than a ThinkPad and since I suspend to RAM most of the time, it could even be practical. Hm.
- pak 13y agoCan't TPM be used for this? It could verify your /boot with keys external to the disk itself. I'm not sure if somebody has actually built a solution that uses it yet. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module
- claudius 13y agoIt could (the same goes for Secure Boot, in some sense). But the three-letter agencies from whom you want to protect yourself here likely have backdoor keys</paranoia>.
- snuxoll 13y agoSure it can, as can its evolution in the form of UEFI's Secure Boot, the problem is everyone wants to label these as technologies to enable lock-in instead of technologies to provide a trusted boot chain to ensure your system isn't compromised.