4 ms·
If your HDD is stolen they can plug it into another computer and copy any file they want.
by lonnyk 13y ago
If your HDD is stolen they can plug it into another computer and copy any file they want.
- claudius 13y agoThey would get quite a few pseudorandom numbers of mine, aside from a self-compiled Linux kernel. :-)
- snuxoll 13y ago> aside from a self-compiled Linux kernel. Likely sitting on an unencrypted /boot, waiting to be replaced by one with a keylogger, am I right? Of course a sane person doesn't trust a system that's been compromised before nuking it and reloading from a clean image.
- claudius 13y agoThere is unfortunately relatively little you can do to thwart such an attack, apart from keeping your notebook with you at all/most times. Though using a USB key for /boot might be an idea, it is a little less clunky than a ThinkPad and since I suspend to RAM most of the time, it could even be practical. Hm.
- pak 13y agoCan't TPM be used for this? It could verify your /boot with keys external to the disk itself. I'm not sure if somebody has actually built a solution that uses it yet. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module
- claudius 13y agoIt could (the same goes for Secure Boot, in some sense). But the three-letter agencies from whom you want to protect yourself here likely have backdoor keys</paranoia>.
- snuxoll 13y agoSure it can, as can its evolution in the form of UEFI's Secure Boot, the problem is everyone wants to label these as technologies to enable lock-in instead of technologies to provide a trusted boot chain to ensure your system isn't compromised.
- ihsw 13y agoCreating multiple SSH keys is an interesting form of obfuscation, but it relies on trimming your bash command history and not using ssh-config files.