3 ms·

Backdooring major services may lead to the mass adoption of encrypted systems. Not immediately, of course, but after the leaks start. Who'd use a backdoored Goo

by ISL 13y ago

Backdooring major services may lead to the mass adoption of encrypted systems. Not immediately, of course, but after the leaks start. Who'd use a backdoored Google Drive for proprietary information when they could use SpiderOak? Can't stop the signal, Mal.

betterunix 13y ago
The FBI is asking for backdoors on the client side of secure communication systems. Did you think they forgot about the 90s? The difference today is this: lots of people are buying restricted computers (tablets, smartphones, even some laptops), and it would not be hard for the government to push backdoors into software distributed via the "app store model." This time there is actually a chance of the Justice Department getting their way.
- DenisM 13y ago
  Android is not restricted, not yet at least. But I see your point, and it's rather alarming.
  - venomsnake 13y ago
    Unless you create your own raspberry pi to used as a (sanctioned from you) mitm proxy that encrypts the paintext on any communication you send to the online services. So basically google get already encrypted mail that only the receiver can decrypt. So it will go like this - I write hi on the IM client, the Pi intercepts the protocol unpacks the hi encrypts it with the private key, sends some base64 to the server who then translates it to the receiver that has similar device installed which does the decryption. It is not perfect but it can be done. And I am sure Mr Schneier can think of something much better in its sleep.
wmf 13y ago
Every Web 2.0 service has been "backdoored" (i.e. storing data in the clear on the servers) all along and very few people have complained. Perhaps inventing a scary term for an existing practice will catalyze some kind of change, but I doubt it.
- schoen 13y ago
  "Backdoor" is the term that we used in the 1990s in connection with proposed anti-encryption measures, and particularly systems like Clipper where encryption was present but had been modified to allow government access ("key escrow" and "key recovery"). In this prototypical case, a potentially otherwise secure design was modified specifically to allow the government to break it. There are still engineering efforts today to do analogous things, including work at ETSI with regard to GSM voice encryption. As a coauthor of the original post, I think the term is still reasonable and useful. I agree that the applicability of "backdoor" to the cases you mention is less clear, and sometimes absent. Often, the main reasons that users don't get to control their own crypto keys may have to do with a service provider's business model and engineering decisions. If facilitating surveillance wasn't one of the main design goals, I can see where "backdoor" feels much less appropriate. (I think I'd argue that it's still an appropriate term if the architectural decisions about encryption are directly influenced by pressure from the government. Legislation to ban certain designs for communications systems should put us squarely in that category.) I'd also like to find ways to encourage users to value end-to-end encryption, but I don't think that was meant to be the point of using the term "backdoor". We are actually talking about legislation here, supposedly meant to change how services are engineered, likely including services and software that are already in use.

by ISL 13y ago

betterunix 13y ago

The FBI is asking for backdoors on the client side of secure communication systems. Did you think they forgot about the 90s? The difference today is this: lots of people are buying restricted computers (tablets, smartphones, even some laptops), and it would not be hard for the government to push backdoors into software distributed via the "app store model." This time there is actually a chance of the Justice Department getting their way.

DenisM 13y ago
Android is not restricted, not yet at least. But I see your point, and it's rather alarming.
- venomsnake 13y ago
  Unless you create your own raspberry pi to used as a (sanctioned from you) mitm proxy that encrypts the paintext on any communication you send to the online services. So basically google get already encrypted mail that only the receiver can decrypt. So it will go like this - I write hi on the IM client, the Pi intercepts the protocol unpacks the hi encrypts it with the private key, sends some base64 to the server who then translates it to the receiver that has similar device installed which does the decryption. It is not perfect but it can be done. And I am sure Mr Schneier can think of something much better in its sleep.

wmf 13y ago

Every Web 2.0 service has been "backdoored" (i.e. storing data in the clear on the servers) all along and very few people have complained. Perhaps inventing a scary term for an existing practice will catalyze some kind of change, but I doubt it.

schoen 13y ago
"Backdoor" is the term that we used in the 1990s in connection with proposed anti-encryption measures, and particularly systems like Clipper where encryption was present but had been modified to allow government access ("key escrow" and "key recovery"). In this prototypical case, a potentially otherwise secure design was modified specifically to allow the government to break it. There are still engineering efforts today to do analogous things, including work at ETSI with regard to GSM voice encryption. As a coauthor of the original post, I think the term is still reasonable and useful. I agree that the applicability of "backdoor" to the cases you mention is less clear, and sometimes absent. Often, the main reasons that users don't get to control their own crypto keys may have to do with a service provider's business model and engineering decisions. If facilitating surveillance wasn't one of the main design goals, I can see where "backdoor" feels much less appropriate. (I think I'd argue that it's still an appropriate term if the architectural decisions about encryption are directly influenced by pressure from the government. Legislation to ban certain designs for communications systems should put us squarely in that category.) I'd also like to find ways to encourage users to value end-to-end encryption, but I don't think that was meant to be the point of using the term "backdoor". We are actually talking about legislation here, supposedly meant to change how services are engineered, likely including services and software that are already in use.