Good point. At some point, you'll need to communicate the onion address over a trusted channel. If you trust SSL, then you can serve the landing page over HTTPS

Good point. At some point, you'll need to communicate the onion address over a trusted channel. If you trust SSL, then you can serve the landing page over HTTPS, or as others have suggested, you could print the address in the New Yorker itself. I have also heard of using Namecoin or other proof of work schemes, although that would be outside the reach of the average user. If neither of these avenues satisfy, a simple idea for defense-in-depth I've thought of is using .onion vanity name generators (see https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot) as a very simple proof of work scheme. For example, silk road's .onion starts with silkroad. Finding such an .onion address for a given private key requires brute force computation - according to the Shallot github, about 25 days. Therefore, generating an .onion with a recognizable string at the beginning makes generating a suitable address for spoofing that much harder. Of course, this is hardly a solution - big scary Tor-style adversaries certainly have more computing power than you - but it is something to consider.