2 ms·

Your confusing the issues of anonymization and eavesdropping. Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on unencrypted Tor traffic, so you should always use end-to-end encry

Your confusing the issues of anonymization and eavesdropping. Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on unencrypted Tor traffic, so you should always use end-to-end encryption if that is a concern. Tor Hidden Services don't need SSL because the protocol is end-to-end encrypted. Authentication is provided by the onion address itself, which is a fingerprint of the server's key.

pilif 13y ago
Their website says that their hidden service is available at http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion. But how do I know that I am on their website? How do I know it's not the compromised tor exit node that's serving me a modified New Yorker page that is just pretending that the hidden service is at http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion when in fact it is at http://tnysbtbxsf356hjy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hjy.onion The data I'm sending can be a huge give-away of my identity - especially if they play along, pretending to be the new yorker and then tricking me into releasing more information than I wanted. If that page that's linking to the hidden service was served over SSL with an EV certificate, then I could be sure that the link isn't faked. Of course the New Yorker could still be compromised by the government, but as long as I'm willing to trust them, I can at least be sure that I just submitted my data to them and not somebody pretending to be them.
- SolarNet 13y ago
  Someone mentioned this somewhere else, but the beauty for print news organizations is that they can print the address physically in their paper.
- icebraining 13y ago
  If that page that's linking to the hidden service was served over SSL with an EV certificate, then I could be sure that the link isn't faked. Of course the New Yorker could still be compromised The New Yorker or any CA capable of issuing EV certificates present in your browser. Do you trust all of them?
  - gwern 13y ago
    Hopefully not, given that just yesterday there was a post on how the Saudis were planning on using CAs as an attack vector...
- handsomeransoms 13y ago
  Good point. At some point, you'll need to communicate the onion address over a trusted channel. If you trust SSL, then you can serve the landing page over HTTPS, or as others have suggested, you could print the address in the New Yorker itself. I have also heard of using Namecoin or other proof of work schemes, although that would be outside the reach of the average user. If neither of these avenues satisfy, a simple idea for defense-in-depth I've thought of is using .onion vanity name generators (see https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot) as a very simple proof of work scheme. For example, silk road's .onion starts with silkroad. Finding such an .onion address for a given private key requires brute force computation - according to the Shallot github, about 25 days. Therefore, generating an .onion with a recognizable string at the beginning makes generating a suitable address for spoofing that much harder. Of course, this is hardly a solution - big scary Tor-style adversaries certainly have more computing power than you - but it is something to consider.

pilif 13y ago

Their website says that their hidden service is available at http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion. But how do I know that I am on their website? How do I know it's not the compromised tor exit node that's serving me a modified New Yorker page that is just pretending that the hidden service is at http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion when in fact it is at http://tnysbtbxsf356hjy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hjy.onion The data I'm sending can be a huge give-away of my identity - especially if they play along, pretending to be the new yorker and then tricking me into releasing more information than I wanted. If that page that's linking to the hidden service was served over SSL with an EV certificate, then I could be sure that the link isn't faked. Of course the New Yorker could still be compromised by the government, but as long as I'm willing to trust them, I can at least be sure that I just submitted my data to them and not somebody pretending to be them.

SolarNet 13y ago
Someone mentioned this somewhere else, but the beauty for print news organizations is that they can print the address physically in their paper.
icebraining 13y ago
If that page that's linking to the hidden service was served over SSL with an EV certificate, then I could be sure that the link isn't faked. Of course the New Yorker could still be compromised The New Yorker or any CA capable of issuing EV certificates present in your browser. Do you trust all of them?
- gwern 13y ago
  Hopefully not, given that just yesterday there was a post on how the Saudis were planning on using CAs as an attack vector...
handsomeransoms 13y ago
Good point. At some point, you'll need to communicate the onion address over a trusted channel. If you trust SSL, then you can serve the landing page over HTTPS, or as others have suggested, you could print the address in the New Yorker itself. I have also heard of using Namecoin or other proof of work schemes, although that would be outside the reach of the average user. If neither of these avenues satisfy, a simple idea for defense-in-depth I've thought of is using .onion vanity name generators (see https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot) as a very simple proof of work scheme. For example, silk road's .onion starts with silkroad. Finding such an .onion address for a given private key requires brute force computation - according to the Shallot github, about 25 days. Therefore, generating an .onion with a recognizable string at the beginning makes generating a suitable address for spoofing that much harder. Of course, this is hardly a solution - big scary Tor-style adversaries certainly have more computing power than you - but it is something to consider.