6 ms·

If you are relying on Tor exit nodes being trustworthy, then you are using Tor incorrectly. All Tor does is anonymize your traffic, it makes no guarantees once

by aplusbi 13y ago

If you are relying on Tor exit nodes being trustworthy, then you are using Tor incorrectly. All Tor does is anonymize your traffic, it makes no guarantees once it leaves the network. Either make sure you are using end-to-end encryption or only use Tor for information you don't mind being public.

pilif 13y ago
My premise is that based on the data I'm submitting, it might be possible to deduce my identity. And it's certainly easy for trained government agents to to trick me into releasing too much information about myself when they pose as New Yorker reporters based on the information I just sent them. If I'm submitting my data to the government posing as the New Yorker I'm exposing myself to much more risk than if I'm submitting my data to the New Yorker, provided I trust them. That's why I'm insisting on that onion link being displayed on a page that's EV signed. Because right now I have no guarantee that their http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion link is actually the address of their drop box and not the honeypot the government has set up and put on a fake New Yorker page which they MITMd me.
- reeses 13y ago
  But that's not an exit node. Yes, any .onion address that you don't personally verify[1] could be something other than it seems. In fact, with sufficient resources, that onion link could be rewritten in transit once it hits the backbone or your last mile provider. How would we know if it's arsta8rst87ars.onion[2] vs. dndspjsnbshsdrsts.onion? [1] And even then... [2] Yes, Colemak
  - ricardobeat 13y ago
    Apparently it can't be rewritten, the address itself is a hash to a server key. That's why it's gibberish and not newyorkerdrop.onion
    - reeses 13y ago
      That's not what I mean. On that page (http://www.newyorker.com/strongbox/ http://www.newyorker.com/strongbox/, no SSL, no hashing, etc.) is an onion link. I see it as http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion. An adversary with sufficient access (whether to the server, or to the network between the New Yorker site and your browser) can rewrite that link without your ever knowing. Then you are legitimately directing your browser, once on Tor, to a spoofed site.
      - sneak 13y ago
        True, but you can bookmark it, and compare it against the one used by others. They're also short - you can write them down and communicate them offline. To compare, ssh uses no PKI, but is relatively resistant to MITM as it stores public key fingerprints for a given service on first access.
        reeses 13y ago
        bookmark...others...offline. Be more paranoid.
        deleted 13y ago
        [deleted]
        jlgreco 13y ago
        Yes, what if someone MiTM's your offline communication... /s If the Feds (or whoever) were swapping out this address at a large scale, then the NYTs would notice and communicate to the public that this was happening. If the NYT was muzzled and every computer that you or anyone you know has it's connection being tampered with, then you are basically fucked anyway and this is the least of your concerns. At this level of paranoia you shouldn't be trusting the NYT anyway... If they are not MiTM'ing this at a large scale, then quick verifications on other networks with other peoples' computers will work just fine.
        13y ago
- aplusbi 13y ago
  I get what you are saying, but that issue has almost nothing to do with Tor. Tor doesn't ensure the secrecy of your content, it only attempts to hide its origin. If you don't trust the recipient then it doesn't matter if Tor is run by the government or not.
- mike-cardwell 13y ago
  You could put on a disguise and use an open wifi access point in a city you've never been to before and bounce through 50 levels of proxy at the same time. If you tell the other person your name, it's not the technologies fault that you're no longer anonymous.
  - reeses 13y ago
    Bingo. Or you send documents that are traceable to a small group of people, including you, and everyone else has protection and/or an alibi. General, General, Colonel, Colonel, Short Bird, Corporal...wait a second.
- dkarl 13y ago
  My premise is that based on the data I'm submitting, it might be possible to deduce my identity. I think the goal of Strongbox is to protect sources in the event that the New Yorker is forced to turn over material to the government. What they never knew, they can't turn over, but that doesn't apply to the information you leak. The government will be able to get at that information because writers will have to keep it for reference while they're writing and fact-checking their articles.

by aplusbi 13y ago

pilif 13y ago

My premise is that based on the data I'm submitting, it might be possible to deduce my identity. And it's certainly easy for trained government agents to to trick me into releasing too much information about myself when they pose as New Yorker reporters based on the information I just sent them. If I'm submitting my data to the government posing as the New Yorker I'm exposing myself to much more risk than if I'm submitting my data to the New Yorker, provided I trust them. That's why I'm insisting on that onion link being displayed on a page that's EV signed. Because right now I have no guarantee that their http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion link is actually the address of their drop box and not the honeypot the government has set up and put on a fake New Yorker page which they MITMd me.

reeses 13y ago
But that's not an exit node. Yes, any .onion address that you don't personally verify[1] could be something other than it seems. In fact, with sufficient resources, that onion link could be rewritten in transit once it hits the backbone or your last mile provider. How would we know if it's arsta8rst87ars.onion[2] vs. dndspjsnbshsdrsts.onion? [1] And even then... [2] Yes, Colemak
- ricardobeat 13y ago
  Apparently it can't be rewritten, the address itself is a hash to a server key. That's why it's gibberish and not newyorkerdrop.onion
  - reeses 13y ago
    That's not what I mean. On that page (http://www.newyorker.com/strongbox/ http://www.newyorker.com/strongbox/, no SSL, no hashing, etc.) is an onion link. I see it as http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion. An adversary with sufficient access (whether to the server, or to the network between the New Yorker site and your browser) can rewrite that link without your ever knowing. Then you are legitimately directing your browser, once on Tor, to a spoofed site.
    - sneak 13y ago
      True, but you can bookmark it, and compare it against the one used by others. They're also short - you can write them down and communicate them offline. To compare, ssh uses no PKI, but is relatively resistant to MITM as it stores public key fingerprints for a given service on first access.
      - reeses 13y ago
        bookmark...others...offline. Be more paranoid.
        deleted 13y ago
        [deleted]
        jlgreco 13y ago
        Yes, what if someone MiTM's your offline communication... /s If the Feds (or whoever) were swapping out this address at a large scale, then the NYTs would notice and communicate to the public that this was happening. If the NYT was muzzled and every computer that you or anyone you know has it's connection being tampered with, then you are basically fucked anyway and this is the least of your concerns. At this level of paranoia you shouldn't be trusting the NYT anyway... If they are not MiTM'ing this at a large scale, then quick verifications on other networks with other peoples' computers will work just fine.
        13y ago
aplusbi 13y ago
I get what you are saying, but that issue has almost nothing to do with Tor. Tor doesn't ensure the secrecy of your content, it only attempts to hide its origin. If you don't trust the recipient then it doesn't matter if Tor is run by the government or not.
mike-cardwell 13y ago
You could put on a disguise and use an open wifi access point in a city you've never been to before and bounce through 50 levels of proxy at the same time. If you tell the other person your name, it's not the technologies fault that you're no longer anonymous.
- reeses 13y ago
  Bingo. Or you send documents that are traceable to a small group of people, including you, and everyone else has protection and/or an alibi. General, General, Colonel, Colonel, Short Bird, Corporal...wait a second.
dkarl 13y ago
My premise is that based on the data I'm submitting, it might be possible to deduce my identity. I think the goal of Strongbox is to protect sources in the event that the New Yorker is forced to turn over material to the government. What they never knew, they can't turn over, but that doesn't apply to the information you leak. The government will be able to get at that information because writers will have to keep it for reference while they're writing and fact-checking their articles.