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Tor over Tor Hidden Services does not go in plaintext and it does not matter if exit nodes are being sniffed, because you never leave the Tor network. That is
by hellais 13y ago
Tor over Tor Hidden Services does not go in plaintext and it does not matter if exit nodes are being sniffed, because you never leave the Tor network.
That is SSL is not a problem for you, because the URL is self authenticating.
This is especially useful if you have a newspaper, because you can print the address on the paper and not have to worry about CA and this kind of stuff.
Worth looking at is probably also GlobaLeaks (https://globaleaks.org/ https://globaleaks.org/) that is a system that also uses Tor HS. This system is more actively developed and is designed to be extendable.
We are also happy to say that just last week we released the 0.2 release of GlobaLeaks. You can see a live demo on our site: https://globaleaks.org/ https://globaleaks.org/.
- duaneb 13y agoWell, the government can connect the onion URI to the new yorker. Would it be feasible to use domestic warrants to identify the server? I'm not sure as to what end as it would still be end-to-end encrypted.
- sneak 13y agoThat's fine, the anonymity works both ways. You can't access an .onion without using tor, and in this way, use of tor prevents the .onion service from knowing who you are. Contrast The Silk Road, where the .onion is being used primarily to protect the identity of the service itself (as most of the users give their physical addresses to the service). Both are hidden services. One is privacy for the client, one is privacy for the server.
- makomk 13y agoOn the other hand, the page telling you what the Hidden Service URL is does go across the Internet as plaintext and can be modified to contain a malicious URL by exit nodes if you view it via Tor, which you'd probably want to.