7 ms·

I was discussing with a colleague whether tor is still trustworthy these days: running exit nodes without ending up in jail or thrown out by your ISP becomes mo

by pilif 13y ago

I was discussing with a colleague whether tor is still trustworthy these days: running exit nodes without ending up in jail or thrown out by your ISP becomes more and more difficult (if it's not impossible already). Also tor still gets a lot if bad press as being nothing but a medium for child porn consumers to hide their tracks. As such I wonder whether there are exit nodes (or even just plain nodes) left that are not being run by governments as honeypots? How can you be sure that the data you are submitting is not intercepted? How can I be sure that all my traffic is not running through one government network (because all tor nodes still left are compromised)? How can I be sure that I'm actually submitting my information to the New Yorker in this case as opposed to a government server posing as them? The announcement page linked is not being served over SSL and the onion URL given isn't using ssl either (as if any ca would sign a cert for that domain, but if the linked page was served over SSL they could publish a fingerprint there) If I had important information to leak, I would probably still have an otherwise uninvolved colleague drop by in person to dump the data for that one (and only one) time. If I had a friend willing to take the risk. Or if there was an EV signed page of the New Yorker listing an SSL fingerprint of a certificate that's used by that tor server, then maybe I could live with the fact that tor is likely compromised. Then again, maybe I'm just a paranoid coward. I'm so glad I don't have access to information anybody would be interested in.

chimeracoder 13y ago
> Then again, maybe I'm just a paranoid coward. I'm so glad I don't have access to information anybody would be interested in. I agree with everything else you're saying, but I should just point out one thing: It doesn't matter whether or not anybody is interested in your information - especially in this era of en-masse passive data collection, you have the right to your own data, which includes the right not to be snooped on by third parties (governmental or otherwise). It doesn't matter whether or not you "have anything to hide", only whether you have anything you want [voluntarily] to show. </rant>
- lifeisstillgood 13y ago
  I think "privacy as a right" is a difficult issue. I am down with "not getting tortured" as a right. But privacy is ... a privative. I think a more useful and fruitful direction will be requiring publication of holding of private data, and then we can enforce any number of outcomes.
- saraid216 13y ago
  Honestly, it's great that you're passionate about the issue, but that doesn't a logical argument make. Privacy is an intuitive concept, but it translates surprisingly poorly to reality. That's not to say privacy doesn't exist or isn't important, but that we don't actually know what it is. Intuition makes for bad law, not least because everyone has different intuitions; it's basically asking, "Why don't programmers just program in English?"
  - gknoy 13y ago
    Thankfully, my kids are learning Lisp before English, so at least that let them program more intuitively. (Kidding: ... if only I could. My son doesn't seem interested in it.)
- jebeng 13y ago
  Do we actually have the right to our own data in America? Or are you just saying we should have the right?
  - reeses 13y ago
    It depends on whether you want someone to grant you rights, in which case, they're privileges.
- pseut 13y ago
  I think you're misreading. "I don't have access to information anybody would be interested in" doesn't mean "I have nothing to hide." It means "I have nothing to leak." I agree with the general statement, though.
anon808 13y ago
> How can you be sure that the data you are submitting is not intercepted? How can I be sure that all my traffic is not running through one government network (because all tor nodes still left are compromised)? How can I be sure that I'm actually submitting my information to the New Yorker in this case as opposed to a government server posing as them? even if this were the case, how could you be personally identified? worst case is the government gets the document you meant for the new yorker, but you still wouldn't be identifiable (unless your name was on the document etc.). Unless you're saying the government runs the majority of tor nodes so they could track back to your ip?
Cakez0r 13y ago
I wonder though, would anybody actually use evidence gathered from Tor in that manner? That would mean revealing that they can feasibly do it and they'd lose a huge intelligence asset. They'd get to see the information, but they wouldn't be able to action it without showing their hand.
- jjoonathan 13y ago
  I'm sure they have channels for information laundering. Example: they present the Tor evidence to one of their classified courts, get a sealed warrant to wiretap your house, and then re-collect the information from a bug they plant directly on your computer. Or they could just watch you closely until you screw up. Or they could honeypot you.
deleted 13y ago
[deleted]
jonknee 13y ago
It would be nice if some of the companies who control a lot of bandwidth would dedicate even a few Gbps to the cause. Google comes to mind, it's in their interest for Tor to be fast and secure so that users in countries with internet restrictions can use Google (China/Iran/Syria all come to mind).
- jeffasinger 13y ago
  The problem with any one company controlling a large portion of the Tor network is that it would open up the network to a few new classes of attacks.
  - jonknee 13y ago
    Multiple companies have the bandwidth.
hellais 13y ago
Tor over Tor Hidden Services does not go in plaintext and it does not matter if exit nodes are being sniffed, because you never leave the Tor network. That is SSL is not a problem for you, because the URL is self authenticating. This is especially useful if you have a newspaper, because you can print the address on the paper and not have to worry about CA and this kind of stuff. Worth looking at is probably also GlobaLeaks (https://globaleaks.org/ https://globaleaks.org/) that is a system that also uses Tor HS. This system is more actively developed and is designed to be extendable. We are also happy to say that just last week we released the 0.2 release of GlobaLeaks. You can see a live demo on our site: https://globaleaks.org/ https://globaleaks.org/.
- duaneb 13y ago
  Well, the government can connect the onion URI to the new yorker. Would it be feasible to use domestic warrants to identify the server? I'm not sure as to what end as it would still be end-to-end encrypted.
  - sneak 13y ago
    That's fine, the anonymity works both ways. You can't access an .onion without using tor, and in this way, use of tor prevents the .onion service from knowing who you are. Contrast The Silk Road, where the .onion is being used primarily to protect the identity of the service itself (as most of the users give their physical addresses to the service). Both are hidden services. One is privacy for the client, one is privacy for the server.
- makomk 13y ago
  On the other hand, the page telling you what the Hidden Service URL is does go across the Internet as plaintext and can be modified to contain a malicious URL by exit nodes if you view it via Tor, which you'd probably want to.
aplusbi 13y ago
If you are relying on Tor exit nodes being trustworthy, then you are using Tor incorrectly. All Tor does is anonymize your traffic, it makes no guarantees once it leaves the network. Either make sure you are using end-to-end encryption or only use Tor for information you don't mind being public.
- pilif 13y ago
  My premise is that based on the data I'm submitting, it might be possible to deduce my identity. And it's certainly easy for trained government agents to to trick me into releasing too much information about myself when they pose as New Yorker reporters based on the information I just sent them. If I'm submitting my data to the government posing as the New Yorker I'm exposing myself to much more risk than if I'm submitting my data to the New Yorker, provided I trust them. That's why I'm insisting on that onion link being displayed on a page that's EV signed. Because right now I have no guarantee that their http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion link is actually the address of their drop box and not the honeypot the government has set up and put on a fake New Yorker page which they MITMd me.
  - reeses 13y ago
    But that's not an exit node. Yes, any .onion address that you don't personally verify[1] could be something other than it seems. In fact, with sufficient resources, that onion link could be rewritten in transit once it hits the backbone or your last mile provider. How would we know if it's arsta8rst87ars.onion[2] vs. dndspjsnbshsdrsts.onion? [1] And even then... [2] Yes, Colemak
    - ricardobeat 13y ago
      Apparently it can't be rewritten, the address itself is a hash to a server key. That's why it's gibberish and not newyorkerdrop.onion
      - reeses 13y ago
        That's not what I mean. On that page (http://www.newyorker.com/strongbox/ http://www.newyorker.com/strongbox/, no SSL, no hashing, etc.) is an onion link. I see it as http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion. An adversary with sufficient access (whether to the server, or to the network between the New Yorker site and your browser) can rewrite that link without your ever knowing. Then you are legitimately directing your browser, once on Tor, to a spoofed site.
kaoD 13y ago
> How can you be sure that the data you are submitting is not intercepted? HTTPS
- tlrobinson 13y ago
  Hidden services can't / don't need HTTPS because they never leave the Tor network and are authenticated by the URL itslef.
  - kaoD 13y ago
    Yep, I'm aware of that. He was specifically referring to exit nodes.
jrochkind1 13y ago
> How can you be sure that the data you are submitting is not intercepted? Tor is not meant to guarantee that your messages are not being intercepted. It is simply not meant to protect against this. Use end-to-end encryption. (Does strongbox use encryption on top of tor? I am not sure). > How can I be sure that all my traffic is not running through one government network (because all tor nodes still left are compromised)? That is the more pertinent question, indeed. That's the correct question about Tor security, and would be what woudl cause Tor to fail at what it does intend to do. There are some written analyses of this risk. > How can I be sure that I'm actually submitting my information to the New Yorker in this case as opposed to a government server posing as them? Tor isn't necceasrily meant to guarantee that either, an SSL cert with a known/trusted fingerprint would be. But you're right the new yorker is not doing the right things here either. I am less worried about the integrity of Tor, but I think you are right that the new yorker is not doing all the right things to maximize security/anonymity here. Security is hard. But among other things, they ought to be serving all strongbox related things (including the endpoint you access over Tor) over https, and publishing their SSL cert fingerprint in multiple places all over the net.
handsomeransoms 13y ago
Your confusing the issues of anonymization and eavesdropping. Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on unencrypted Tor traffic, so you should always use end-to-end encryption if that is a concern. Tor Hidden Services don't need SSL because the protocol is end-to-end encrypted. Authentication is provided by the onion address itself, which is a fingerprint of the server's key.
- pilif 13y ago
  Their website says that their hidden service is available at http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion. But how do I know that I am on their website? How do I know it's not the compromised tor exit node that's serving me a modified New Yorker page that is just pretending that the hidden service is at http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion when in fact it is at http://tnysbtbxsf356hjy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hjy.onion The data I'm sending can be a huge give-away of my identity - especially if they play along, pretending to be the new yorker and then tricking me into releasing more information than I wanted. If that page that's linking to the hidden service was served over SSL with an EV certificate, then I could be sure that the link isn't faked. Of course the New Yorker could still be compromised by the government, but as long as I'm willing to trust them, I can at least be sure that I just submitted my data to them and not somebody pretending to be them.
  - SolarNet 13y ago
    Someone mentioned this somewhere else, but the beauty for print news organizations is that they can print the address physically in their paper.
  - icebraining 13y ago
    If that page that's linking to the hidden service was served over SSL with an EV certificate, then I could be sure that the link isn't faked. Of course the New Yorker could still be compromised The New Yorker or any CA capable of issuing EV certificates present in your browser. Do you trust all of them?
    - 13y ago
unhammer 13y ago
> the onion URL given isn't using ssl either doesn't need that hacky ssl stuff, it's end-to-end encrypted within the tor network. http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/11727/does-tor-hidden-service-protocol-provide-more-threat-protection-than-a-standard http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/11727/does-tor-h... they could print the onion url in their newspaper even, if you don't trust your connection to the announcement. But yeah at sone point there is always some trust involved.
JacobHenner 13y ago
As a Tor Exit Node Operator, I can say that not all of the nodes are compromised.

by pilif 13y ago

chimeracoder 13y ago

> Then again, maybe I'm just a paranoid coward. I'm so glad I don't have access to information anybody would be interested in. I agree with everything else you're saying, but I should just point out one thing: It doesn't matter whether or not anybody is interested in your information - especially in this era of en-masse passive data collection, you have the right to your own data, which includes the right not to be snooped on by third parties (governmental or otherwise). It doesn't matter whether or not you "have anything to hide", only whether you have anything you want [voluntarily] to show. </rant>

lifeisstillgood 13y ago
I think "privacy as a right" is a difficult issue. I am down with "not getting tortured" as a right. But privacy is ... a privative. I think a more useful and fruitful direction will be requiring publication of holding of private data, and then we can enforce any number of outcomes.
saraid216 13y ago
Honestly, it's great that you're passionate about the issue, but that doesn't a logical argument make. Privacy is an intuitive concept, but it translates surprisingly poorly to reality. That's not to say privacy doesn't exist or isn't important, but that we don't actually know what it is. Intuition makes for bad law, not least because everyone has different intuitions; it's basically asking, "Why don't programmers just program in English?"
- gknoy 13y ago
  Thankfully, my kids are learning Lisp before English, so at least that let them program more intuitively. (Kidding: ... if only I could. My son doesn't seem interested in it.)
jebeng 13y ago
Do we actually have the right to our own data in America? Or are you just saying we should have the right?
- reeses 13y ago
  It depends on whether you want someone to grant you rights, in which case, they're privileges.
pseut 13y ago
I think you're misreading. "I don't have access to information anybody would be interested in" doesn't mean "I have nothing to hide." It means "I have nothing to leak." I agree with the general statement, though.

anon808 13y ago

> How can you be sure that the data you are submitting is not intercepted? How can I be sure that all my traffic is not running through one government network (because all tor nodes still left are compromised)? How can I be sure that I'm actually submitting my information to the New Yorker in this case as opposed to a government server posing as them? even if this were the case, how could you be personally identified? worst case is the government gets the document you meant for the new yorker, but you still wouldn't be identifiable (unless your name was on the document etc.). Unless you're saying the government runs the majority of tor nodes so they could track back to your ip?

Cakez0r 13y ago

I wonder though, would anybody actually use evidence gathered from Tor in that manner? That would mean revealing that they can feasibly do it and they'd lose a huge intelligence asset. They'd get to see the information, but they wouldn't be able to action it without showing their hand.

jjoonathan 13y ago
I'm sure they have channels for information laundering. Example: they present the Tor evidence to one of their classified courts, get a sealed warrant to wiretap your house, and then re-collect the information from a bug they plant directly on your computer. Or they could just watch you closely until you screw up. Or they could honeypot you.

deleted 13y ago

[deleted]

jonknee 13y ago

It would be nice if some of the companies who control a lot of bandwidth would dedicate even a few Gbps to the cause. Google comes to mind, it's in their interest for Tor to be fast and secure so that users in countries with internet restrictions can use Google (China/Iran/Syria all come to mind).

jeffasinger 13y ago
The problem with any one company controlling a large portion of the Tor network is that it would open up the network to a few new classes of attacks.
- jonknee 13y ago
  Multiple companies have the bandwidth.

hellais 13y ago

Tor over Tor Hidden Services does not go in plaintext and it does not matter if exit nodes are being sniffed, because you never leave the Tor network. That is SSL is not a problem for you, because the URL is self authenticating. This is especially useful if you have a newspaper, because you can print the address on the paper and not have to worry about CA and this kind of stuff. Worth looking at is probably also GlobaLeaks (https://globaleaks.org/ https://globaleaks.org/) that is a system that also uses Tor HS. This system is more actively developed and is designed to be extendable. We are also happy to say that just last week we released the 0.2 release of GlobaLeaks. You can see a live demo on our site: https://globaleaks.org/ https://globaleaks.org/.

duaneb 13y ago
Well, the government can connect the onion URI to the new yorker. Would it be feasible to use domestic warrants to identify the server? I'm not sure as to what end as it would still be end-to-end encrypted.
- sneak 13y ago
  That's fine, the anonymity works both ways. You can't access an .onion without using tor, and in this way, use of tor prevents the .onion service from knowing who you are. Contrast The Silk Road, where the .onion is being used primarily to protect the identity of the service itself (as most of the users give their physical addresses to the service). Both are hidden services. One is privacy for the client, one is privacy for the server.
makomk 13y ago
On the other hand, the page telling you what the Hidden Service URL is does go across the Internet as plaintext and can be modified to contain a malicious URL by exit nodes if you view it via Tor, which you'd probably want to.

aplusbi 13y ago

If you are relying on Tor exit nodes being trustworthy, then you are using Tor incorrectly. All Tor does is anonymize your traffic, it makes no guarantees once it leaves the network. Either make sure you are using end-to-end encryption or only use Tor for information you don't mind being public.

pilif 13y ago
My premise is that based on the data I'm submitting, it might be possible to deduce my identity. And it's certainly easy for trained government agents to to trick me into releasing too much information about myself when they pose as New Yorker reporters based on the information I just sent them. If I'm submitting my data to the government posing as the New Yorker I'm exposing myself to much more risk than if I'm submitting my data to the New Yorker, provided I trust them. That's why I'm insisting on that onion link being displayed on a page that's EV signed. Because right now I have no guarantee that their http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion link is actually the address of their drop box and not the honeypot the government has set up and put on a fake New Yorker page which they MITMd me.
- reeses 13y ago
  But that's not an exit node. Yes, any .onion address that you don't personally verify[1] could be something other than it seems. In fact, with sufficient resources, that onion link could be rewritten in transit once it hits the backbone or your last mile provider. How would we know if it's arsta8rst87ars.onion[2] vs. dndspjsnbshsdrsts.onion? [1] And even then... [2] Yes, Colemak
  - ricardobeat 13y ago
    Apparently it can't be rewritten, the address itself is a hash to a server key. That's why it's gibberish and not newyorkerdrop.onion
    - reeses 13y ago
      That's not what I mean. On that page (http://www.newyorker.com/strongbox/ http://www.newyorker.com/strongbox/, no SSL, no hashing, etc.) is an onion link. I see it as http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion. An adversary with sufficient access (whether to the server, or to the network between the New Yorker site and your browser) can rewrite that link without your ever knowing. Then you are legitimately directing your browser, once on Tor, to a spoofed site.

kaoD 13y ago

> How can you be sure that the data you are submitting is not intercepted? HTTPS

tlrobinson 13y ago
Hidden services can't / don't need HTTPS because they never leave the Tor network and are authenticated by the URL itslef.
- kaoD 13y ago
  Yep, I'm aware of that. He was specifically referring to exit nodes.

jrochkind1 13y ago

> How can you be sure that the data you are submitting is not intercepted? Tor is not meant to guarantee that your messages are not being intercepted. It is simply not meant to protect against this. Use end-to-end encryption. (Does strongbox use encryption on top of tor? I am not sure). > How can I be sure that all my traffic is not running through one government network (because all tor nodes still left are compromised)? That is the more pertinent question, indeed. That's the correct question about Tor security, and would be what woudl cause Tor to fail at what it does intend to do. There are some written analyses of this risk. > How can I be sure that I'm actually submitting my information to the New Yorker in this case as opposed to a government server posing as them? Tor isn't necceasrily meant to guarantee that either, an SSL cert with a known/trusted fingerprint would be. But you're right the new yorker is not doing the right things here either. I am less worried about the integrity of Tor, but I think you are right that the new yorker is not doing all the right things to maximize security/anonymity here. Security is hard. But among other things, they ought to be serving all strongbox related things (including the endpoint you access over Tor) over https, and publishing their SSL cert fingerprint in multiple places all over the net.

handsomeransoms 13y ago

Your confusing the issues of anonymization and eavesdropping. Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on unencrypted Tor traffic, so you should always use end-to-end encryption if that is a concern. Tor Hidden Services don't need SSL because the protocol is end-to-end encrypted. Authentication is provided by the onion address itself, which is a fingerprint of the server's key.

pilif 13y ago
Their website says that their hidden service is available at http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion. But how do I know that I am on their website? How do I know it's not the compromised tor exit node that's serving me a modified New Yorker page that is just pretending that the hidden service is at http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hiy.onion when in fact it is at http://tnysbtbxsf356hjy.onion http://tnysbtbxsf356hjy.onion The data I'm sending can be a huge give-away of my identity - especially if they play along, pretending to be the new yorker and then tricking me into releasing more information than I wanted. If that page that's linking to the hidden service was served over SSL with an EV certificate, then I could be sure that the link isn't faked. Of course the New Yorker could still be compromised by the government, but as long as I'm willing to trust them, I can at least be sure that I just submitted my data to them and not somebody pretending to be them.
- SolarNet 13y ago
  Someone mentioned this somewhere else, but the beauty for print news organizations is that they can print the address physically in their paper.
- icebraining 13y ago
  If that page that's linking to the hidden service was served over SSL with an EV certificate, then I could be sure that the link isn't faked. Of course the New Yorker could still be compromised The New Yorker or any CA capable of issuing EV certificates present in your browser. Do you trust all of them?
  - 13y ago

unhammer 13y ago

> the onion URL given isn't using ssl either doesn't need that hacky ssl stuff, it's end-to-end encrypted within the tor network. http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/11727/does-tor-hidden-service-protocol-provide-more-threat-protection-than-a-standard http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/11727/does-tor-h... they could print the onion url in their newspaper even, if you don't trust your connection to the announcement. But yeah at sone point there is always some trust involved.

JacobHenner 13y ago

As a Tor Exit Node Operator, I can say that not all of the nodes are compromised.