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The New Yorker Strongbox
- ISL 14y agoHow do we know that Tor is reliable? It's the de facto standard, but, barring bugs, is it provably NSA-resistant?
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- ISL 14y agoI'm less concerned for the encryption. In principle, Tor guarantees anonymity - my question is really, "How guaranteed is that anonymity, assuming Tor's implementation is correct?" I concur that, if anyone has been able to break Tor, they haven't made use of it in any public way. You can only really do that once. Put another way: Suppose I want to know who is sending messages to the New Yorker's strongbox, but I don't have physical access to their isolated system. Can I figure it out? How many Tor nodes would I need to compromise to have a ~5% shot at discovering interesting information about the sender?
- 616c 14y agoI am not sure you can put down a real number, but the developers are in concert with power users, and they are well aware of when something is fishy and they patch quickly, specifically for the very well-known state actors that Tor irks (e.g., China and Iran). See one such recent example: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/iran-blocks-tor-tor-releases-same-day-fix https://blog.torproject.org/blog/iran-blocks-tor-tor-release... And yes, I know this supposes it is an obvious attack vector, and this is not really disastrous; they got blocked. I encourage you to read the Tor Project blog. They did, for example, an excellent writeup of how BEAST was not impacting them, and did a very detailed layman's article on how, even if their implementation did not pad TLS the way it did, would still not be exploitable with the BEAST exploit. https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-and-beast-ssl-attack https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-and-beast-ssl-attack There are a lot of eyeballs, and all the usual cathedral and bazaar quotes will tell you I trust their implementations, despite its dubious origin with a Naval Postgraduate School thesis, than other systems that are not open source.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- shabble 14y agoEven if it is already entirely broken by them, there's the question of whether they'll risk revealing that fact by going after you (publicly) c.f. Ultra[1] level intelligence from breaking Enigma. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultra_%28cryptography%29#Safeguarding_of_sources https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultra_%28cryptography%29#Safeg...
- acheron 14y agoYes, we all read Cryptonomicon too.
- wiml 14y agoPedantic response: There's surprisingly little provable (in the mathematical sense) security in the crypto world. It's possible, though rather unlikely, that the NSA has a cheap way to factor large numbers and has been laughing at us all for decades. Less pedantic response: Tor does use good strong crypto and has been examined by many experts, both practical and theoretical; I'd be surprised if the crypto, protocol design, or even the implementation is the weakest spot. One weak spot it does have is traffic analysis. Any low-latency anonymity network has this problem: if someone can observe the traffic in and out of enough nodes on the network (even if they can't decrypt any of it) they can statistically correlate arrival times and figure out who is talking to whom pretty reliably. Even if you can't read the data, reading the envelopes is enough to plug leaks, find dissidents, etc.. (Consider the Associated Press phone records affair.) If the attacker can experiment by causing brief interruptions or delays on the circuits between nodes they can extract even more information. Google will find you many cites on this subject. The Tor project tries to mitigate this but considers a full solution out-of-scope (for fairly good reasons, I think). There aren't many projects that really do try to address it --- the old cypherpunk Mixmaster network is the only one I know of offhand. And even there, the best you can do really is up the constant factors of the attack, or push the attack one level up into the greater network of human communication ("who knew X, at a time they could have communicated it to Y? Who knew Z, at such a time?").
- jjmardlin 14y agoIt's great to see a reputable organization finding use for Tor and online anonymity. Innovative, advantage gaining move in a not so innovative industry.
- grandalf 14y agoIn the past decade, the New Yorker has been the only news organization (aside from Wikileaks) doing significant investigative journalism.
- ISL 14y agoOnly? Tne Stranger? Seattle Times?
- avn2109 14y agoAlmost true but not quite. Both Harper's and Mother Jones can generally be counted upon to rake a little muck.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- rthomas6 14y agoThat's quite an assertion. I'd say that a few public radio programs I listen to have done some great investigative journalism. Specifically: http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/487/harper-high-school-part-one http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/487/h... http://apps.npr.org/unfit-for-work/ http://apps.npr.org/unfit-for-work/ http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/05/07/182010027/episode-456-marijuana-arbitrage http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/05/07/182010027/episode-... http://www.propublica.org/article/finding-oscar-massacre-memory-and-justice-in-guatemala http://www.propublica.org/article/finding-oscar-massacre-mem...
- grandalf 14y agoNPR is great, but never questions the legitimacy of the US Government.
- danso 14y agoFYI, "Strongbox" is a fork for the open source project that Aaron coded, which is called "DeadDrop"...it was down because Github pages was recently down, but back up now: http://deaddrop.github.io/ http://deaddrop.github.io/ The repo contains this thorough Threat Model/theory guide: https://github.com/deaddrop/DeadDropDocs/blob/master/THREAT_MODEL.md https://github.com/deaddrop/DeadDropDocs/blob/master/THREAT_...
- masklinn 14y agoIt not a fork, it's the first production use since DeadDrop was discussed with/instigated by New Yorker journos. In fact, there's a shoot-out and link to DeadDrop in the page's introduction. Not sure why you thought an FYI was necessary...
- danso 14y agoI came across StrongBox in this blog post, in which DeadDrop was mentioned but the repo not linked to: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/05/strongbox-and-aaron-swartz.html http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/05/stron... In the OP, "DeadDrop" is listed prominently but not as text...so when I came to the page, my first instinct was to do a Find for "deaddrop" to see if the repo was there, which comes up empty of course. Without reading the Aaron Swartz post, I would've assumed "DeadDrop" was an existing service because of the brandlogo, and not a link to the open source repo. Note: I'm not saying there's anything wrong with how it's done, I'm just pointing out my thought process: Anyone who comes to the OP without having read the Aaron Swartz post would not know of the open-source project underneath it (though it isn't a fork, so my mistake) and may not click through the "DeadDrop" logo. People who have read the Swartz post may be like me, wondering where the Github code is, as it is not linked to in the Swartz post. Just trying to make the project more visible for those of us less skilled at sussing out HTML. No fault of the New Yorker's...both posts are aimed at different audiences (though the Swartz post should probably just include a link straight to DeadDrop for convenience's sake)
- danso 14y agoI came across StrongBox in this blog post, in which DeadDrop was mentioned but the repo not linked to: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/05/strongbox-and-aaron-swartz.html http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/05/stron... In the OP, "DeadDrop" is listed prominently but not as text...so when I came to the page, my first instinct was to do a Find for "deaddrop" to see if the repo was there, which comes up empty of course. Without reading the Aaron Swartz post, I would've assumed "DeadDrop" was an existing service because of the brandlogo, and not a link to the open source repo. Note: I'm not saying there's anything wrong with how it's done, I'm just pointing out my thought process: Anyone who comes to the OP without having read the Aaron Swartz post would not know of the open-source project underneath it (though it isn't a fork, so my mistake) and may not click through the "DeadDrop" logo. People who have read the Swartz post may be like me, wondering where the Github code is, as it is not linked to in the Swartz post. Just trying to make the project more visible for those of us less skilled at sussing out HTML. No fault of the New Yorker's...both posts are aimed at different audiences (though the Swartz post should probably just include a link straight to DeadDrop for convenience's sake)
- zimbatm 14y agoI hope this becomes a standard, every news organization needs one of these.
- thruflo 14y agoMight be useful to serve that page over https so the .onion address it contains can't be changed by a man in the middle.
- nijk 14y agoAs it is now, unsecured, it is a complete honeypot to catch senders.
- daviddoran 14y agoAgree. I think they should be using HTTPs, HSTS etc for this page.
- bjacobel 14y agoGithub Pages, to my knowledge, doesn't support HTTPS. They'd have to move it.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- dangrossman 14y agoThat doesn't help if you're talking securely to the wrong address.
- dbpatterson 14y agoThe parent was saying that the onion address could be changed. Did you even read what they wrote? [edit] because the original poster deleted their post, it said something like: that's pointless, because tor ensures that communication is secure [/edit]
- gesman 14y agoVERY wise move! Contrary to tormail.org - you know who owns the TOR-based messaging system and this will surely increase an inflow of "hot" [albeit unverifiable] stories! Great way to stay ahead of less techy competition.
- pqdbr 14y agoThis is amazing because it's endorsed by a major mainstream news organization. A good point when arguing with those that defend that Tor is only meant for terrorism, child pornography and illegal activities.
- pyre 14y ago| Tor is only meant for Tor was developed by the US Navy so that people in oppressive regimes could have secure communications, though I guess that could qualify as 'illegal activities' under the laws of said regimes...
- ck2 14y agoSoooo can .onion addresses be spoofed for MIM attacks?
- pwenzel 14y agoMan in the middle attacks on Tor are possible. Check out Moxie Marlinspike's 2009 BlackHat DC Presentation on SSL Stripping: http://vimeo.com/50018478 http://vimeo.com/50018478 http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/ http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/
- nwh 14y agoAttacks such as those referenced are are not relevant in this case. As this website is being served as a hidden service, the traffic never exits the Tor network. There's no SSL in use for a MITM attack to remove, nor does there need to be.
- bhitov 14y agoMoxie demonstrated sslstrip on Tor exit nodes. It will not work on hidden services as the address contains a hash of the server's public key.
- igul222 14y agoI don't get the point. If you trust them, isn't it okay to reveal your identity to The New Yorker anyway since they're legally protected from being compelled to reveal your identity? And if you don't trust them, why should you trust that they're not logging your identity even on Strongbox? http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protection_of_sources http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protection_of_sources
- nwh 14y agoWIth Tor your identity can't be logged. Even if they are forced to reveal their logs, they'd be completely worthless.
- duck 14y agoHave you some how avoided the news from the last couple days?
- tlrobinson 14y agoActually I have, what are you referring to?
- zokier 14y agoU.S. Secretly Obtains Two Months of A.P. Phone Records https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5701436 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5701436
- k-mcgrady 14y agoIf you read the first paragraph of the wikipedia article you link you'll see this in the last line: "In the United States, the federal government legally contends that no such protection exists for journalists." There are well documented cases (and even a movie based on true events) of journalists having to go to prison because they wouldn't reveal sources. e.g. Found this on Google searching "reporter source prison": http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/04/08/as-fox-news-reporter-faces-jail-time-for-protecting-source-jake-tapper-wants-to-know-wheres-the-public-outrage/ http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/04/08/as-fox-news-repor...
- smoorman1024 14y agoNice to see a strong endorsement of Tor. I imagine it will help The New Yorker attract new sources for their stories.
- nsxwolf 14y agoThe government has really showed us how little we can trust them in the last couple weeks. Go Tor!
- rsync 14y agoToR is funded by the US government.
- jagermo 14y agoand, according to about TOR [0], it is still used by the US Navy for intelligence gathering. Which is probably the best protection for the project, since those guys really care about anonymity. [0]: https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en
- tnorthcutt 14y agoSource? Edit: looked it up myself: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324677204578185382377144280.html?mod=googlenews_wsj http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732467720457818...
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- lawnchair_larry 14y agoWhat does that have to do with his claim that the USG is not trustworthy? Are you implying that it isn't the solution that it claims to be, due to the funding source?
- rsync 14y agoI'm not claiming anything - I'm simply pointing out that the answer to the question "will tor protect me" has a little bit more nuance than it is usually answered with...
- lawnchair_larry 14y ago
- ianso 14y agoNice. I have to say this is the best approach to "wikileaks"-style journalism since wikileaks itself imploded. Now here's hoping they have what it takes to publish what lands in their inbox, even when the US Govt objects...
- FramesPerSushi 14y agoWhat an awesome idea, this needs to become a standard. This will lead to lots of interesting and previously impossible stories in the future!
- salimmadjd 14y agoIt's a sad day when a US based publication is leading the charge to protect its sources to ensure the vitality of the freedom of the press. I had expected this in an authoritarian regime, not here.
- brown9-2 14y agoI disagree. Sometimes maintaining that type of freedom of the press requires strong vigilance and defense on the side of the press, rather than taking it as a given.
- Jun8 14y agoIn a real authoritarian regime this page would not have existed at all due to government pressure (or would have been a honeypot for government). Such regimes generally work through the double whammy of threat of action (legal or thug-based, e.g. in Russia) to the actual reporters who uncover dirt and subtler threats/coercions to their bosses, the latter of which leads to self-censorship and is much preferred. A recent example of the second approach is the suppression of news about the bombing in Reyhanli in the Turkish press.
- salimmadjd 14y agoI considered the same argument you are making before posting my comment. However, for this to have happened in USA it means we are half way there or getting there. The media is controlled by two factions now: Government through access (you don't get to come to white house if you piss us off or you wont get the interview) Large corporations and the major characters behind them. (i.e. Fox news, Viacom, etc. This is not the path to maintain an open society. We don't need thugs like less sophisticated media controlled countries , we control media in a much more elegant way. But the results are the same!
- brown9-2 14y agoAs the blog post announcing this points out (http://m.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/05/introducing-strongbox-anonymous-document-sharing-tool.html http://m.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/05/introd...) in a lot of ways this is an extension of the mailing address or phone number that the New Yorker has advertised (and informants have been using) since the 1920s.
- jmmcd 14y agoWhat is the purpose of the people on the New Yorker end having to switch machines? How can the submitter trust that they've done that?
- mcdigman 14y agoBecause the internet facing machine could have been infected with malware that allows someone to read the decrypted message, and send it back over the internet. First, being compromised in the first place is less likely for the machine not connected to the internet, because it is booted fresh from a CD-ROM every time, and the CD is read only, so in order to install something unwanted on the computer the attacker would have to physically replace the CD. Second, even if it were compromised, it is not connected to the internet, so there should not be any way for it to transmit the information, again unless someone has physically bugged the machine.
- Serow225 14y agoI'm pretty much ignorant about Tor, but I'm curious why the .onion strongbox address they give is a string of random characters, instead of something recognizable/memorable?
- pixelcort 14y agoIf you combine Namecoin with Tor you could get close. Have a Namecoin .bit address point to a Tor .onion address. As long as you don't let the .bit address expire, you'll have a secure, easy to remember address people can use to access your hidden server.
- pablobm 14y agoI don't know the specifics, but my understanding is that the seemingly random string of characters is a crypto signature. If I'm not mistaken, it makes the site safe from Man In The Middle attacks.
- ef4 14y agoThe address is also a public key. No one else can pretend to be the New Yorker unless they have the corresponding private key. If the address was just "newyorker.onion", you'd still need to find some way of safely verifying the public key to make sure you're really talking to the New Yorker.
- Serow225 14y agoThis could be a naive question, but would it be possible to allow the site to choose their public key text? That way they could choose 'newyorkerstrongbox' or similar.
- ComputerGuru 14y agoI'm not surprised to see this coming from The New Yorker. I've all but given up on quality journalism from most "newspapers," but long-form investigative articles from The New Yorker and Vanity Fair (yes, of all places!) always keep my faith in humanity. Less-lengthy but usually well-researched articles from Mother Jones and Harper's are also up there. Other sources that sometimes do an awesome job but other days leave you scratching your head would be NPR, The Atlantic (less investigative journalism, but awesome write-ups), The New York Times (covering everything from tabloid trash to 20-page quality journalism spreads), and The Seattle Times (likewise, but less crappy and less awesome at both extremes).
- blhack 14y ago>Vanity Fair (yes, of all places!) Vanity Fair had Christopher Hitchens as a contributing editor for a long time. I'd say that alone gives them some journalistic credibility.
- dopamean 14y agoSeriously. I'm always baffled by statements like, "Vanity Fair is actually really good!" Yes, they do good reporting. They also cover fashion and lifestyles very well too.
- majani 14y agoClaiming that fashion and entertainment don't matter is a meme amongst some people who long to be seen as intellectually superior.
- sampsonjs 14y agoHitchens is the guy who claimed the Viet Cong/NLF never used car bombs, right? Saddam was working with AQ all along? And lots of other bullshit? No, he was a disgrace, and that rag's association with him does not reflect well on them.
- icebraining 14y ago
- ignostic 14y agoGood for the New Yorker; I hope this catches on. Unfortunately, if the encryption is not end-to-end, the data is not secure. In fact, the NSA may choose to hang out and watch the unsecured traffic flow. The New Yorker should make the traffic a little more secure by encrypting traffic (using https). There have been past instances where similar weaknesses were exploited by sniffers: http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks?currentPage=all http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_...
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- zokier 14y agoDo CAs actually sign .onion certs? Of course they could go self-signed with fingerprint on the public-web site, but that would make it more difficult to use for fairly minor gain.
- ef4 14y agoThat vulnerability applies when accessing normal web pages via Tor. But that's now what the New Yorker has set up. They're hosting a Tor hidden service, and in that case Tor is necessarily encrypting the traffic end-to-end.
- 286c8cb04bda 14y agoThe problem is that you got the .onion address from an unsecured web page. Someone between you and that unsecured web page could've changed the .onion address and when you went there you would be visiting a Strongbox hosted by the NSA rather than one for The New Yorker.
- mcdigman 14y agoThis is why you typically want to publish things like this as far and wide as possible - if any single source is compromised, it can be detected by noticing a discrepancy between two publicly available addresses. I'd wager they'll put it in their print edition (same as their physical address and phone number) from now on, because the NSA probably isn't going to everyone's house swapping out their magazines for altered ones, so anyone who gets the magazine will have a hard copy of the address.
- tenpoundhammer 14y agoI'm really searching for an Al Gore joke here, someone help me out.
- derrida 14y agoGlobaLeaks enables news organizations to offer a similar functionality: github.com/GlobaLeaks Includes some Tor developers on the dev team. They have been working on this for 2-3 years in the open and would appreciate bug reports & people to run the code. They also currently maintain Tor2Web, the first version of which was written by aaronsw
- pilif 14y agoI was discussing with a colleague whether tor is still trustworthy these days: running exit nodes without ending up in jail or thrown out by your ISP becomes more and more difficult (if it's not impossible already). Also tor still gets a lot if bad press as being nothing but a medium for child porn consumers to hide their tracks. As such I wonder whether there are exit nodes (or even just plain nodes) left that are not being run by governments as honeypots? How can you be sure that the data you are submitting is not intercepted? How can I be sure that all my traffic is not running through one government network (because all tor nodes still left are compromised)? How can I be sure that I'm actually submitting my information to the New Yorker in this case as opposed to a government server posing as them? The announcement page linked is not being served over SSL and the onion URL given isn't using ssl either (as if any ca would sign a cert for that domain, but if the linked page was served over SSL they could publish a fingerprint there) If I had important information to leak, I would probably still have an otherwise uninvolved colleague drop by in person to dump the data for that one (and only one) time. If I had a friend willing to take the risk. Or if there was an EV signed page of the New Yorker listing an SSL fingerprint of a certificate that's used by that tor server, then maybe I could live with the fact that tor is likely compromised. Then again, maybe I'm just a paranoid coward. I'm so glad I don't have access to information anybody would be interested in.
- chimeracoder 14y ago> Then again, maybe I'm just a paranoid coward. I'm so glad I don't have access to information anybody would be interested in. I agree with everything else you're saying, but I should just point out one thing: It doesn't matter whether or not anybody is interested in your information - especially in this era of en-masse passive data collection, you have the right to your own data, which includes the right not to be snooped on by third parties (governmental or otherwise). It doesn't matter whether or not you "have anything to hide", only whether you have anything you want [voluntarily] to show. </rant>
- lifeisstillgood 14y agoI think "privacy as a right" is a difficult issue. I am down with "not getting tortured" as a right. But privacy is ... a privative. I think a more useful and fruitful direction will be requiring publication of holding of private data, and then we can enforce any number of outcomes.
- revscat 14y agoThis comment is somewhat parenthetical, but one thing I am glad to see is that the cyberpunk/cypherpunk spirit that was so influential in the early days of the Internet has carried on over into today. There are areas -- important ones -- where anonymity and cryptography are necessary tools in addressing various wrongs, regardless of the objections of the state. That a mainstream journalism organization like The New Yorker has recognized this, and has found it important enough to implement a technical means of addressing, shows that the work of pioneers like Zimmerman, Assange, Schwartz, and many others have been fruitful over the long term.
- obi-nine 14y agoThey should definitely generate a vanity onion address. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=118194.0 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=118194.0
- brown9-2 14y agoThe deaddrop installation documents (https://github.com/deaddrop/deaddropdocs/ https://github.com/deaddrop/deaddropdocs/) refer to a repo at https://github.com/deaddrop/deaddrop_puppet https://github.com/deaddrop/deaddrop_puppet which doesn't seem to have been made public yet. Would be interesting to see the rest of the installation procedure.
- lowglow 14y agoTrying to do something similar here: http://valleyanon.com/ http://valleyanon.com/ - Let me know if you're interested in helping out with the project.
- benrmatthews 14y agoOut of interest, what are other potential applications for Dead Drop, beyond journalism?
- DanBC 14y agoThis thread - of smart people - shows a little bit of confusion over the difference between anonymous and secret. That's kind of scary when we think about the reasons someone might be sending stuff to a newspaper, and the need that have to be anonymous. Secret would probably be good too. At least until the newspaper prints. Newspapers are supposed to explain stuff to their audience. This article doesn't explain much. Like the saying goes, when I see how badly they do with stuff I know about I have to wonder about everything else too.
- tyang 14y agoWhat's a good guess here as to the signal to noise ratio?