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So, even though the government can snoop on us, we shouldn't stop using CAs, because then the government could snoop on us. With TACK you depend on CAs to esta
by peterwwillis 14y ago
So, even though the government can snoop on us, we shouldn't stop using CAs, because then the government could snoop on us.
With TACK you depend on CAs to establish the initial connection, set up a "pin", and then no longer rely on the CA for future connections. That initial connection is fungible by a MITM, so it's not secure. We need a term for connections that are "probably" secure, but for which there is no complete assurance of security, which is what any connection based around a CA really is.
This is why the postcard method is superior. Unless someone spends the time to intercept every anonymous postcard with a secret code on it, rewrite the message with perfect imitation handwriting, and send it on to the unknown P.O. box, without more than a couple days delay, it's next to impossible to circumvent this initial key exchange. For those that need real privacy I would recommend this method; for those that just want to order Jolt Cola on an open wifi connection, CAs are good enough.
- tptacek 14y agoYes, that is exactly what I am saying. The current CA situation is bad, the "abandon the CAs and come up with an interim plan" solution is worse. Meanwhile, the world in which most of the mainstream browsers support TACK is imperfect, but immediately better than what we have now. TACK also sets us up to continue decoupling ourselves from the CA system.
- peterwwillis 14y agoNobody has to abandon CAs just because a new model is adopted. It's not like the old infrastructure will stop working (as long as there's a free market) Pre-loaded public key pinning shipped by modern browsers is a better way forward IMHO. If you're trusting your browser enough to run their software, you might as well get your public keys from them, too. IMO, TACK works about as well as self-signed certs with the 'remember this certificate' option - just don't use a Starbucks connection the first time you browse the site.
- tptacek 14y agoNo, that's not true. When you bring your laptop to Starbucks and deal with a site with self-signed certs, you're susceptible every time to that MITM attack; on the other hand, you're susceptible only the first time you connect to a site using TACK.
- willvarfar 14y ago(Small technical nit-pick: the mass automated MITM of all postcards is entirely possible and with a ridiculously small budget too.)