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In practice, OTR is more useful than PGP and widely more deployed. HTTPS is less secure in practice (due to just being transport security and lots of intermedi
by rdl 14y ago
In practice, OTR is more useful than PGP and widely more deployed.
HTTPS is less secure in practice (due to just being transport security and lots of intermediaries to attack), but still decent, and fairly widely used.
SSH is still the only cryptographic system which was so well implemented (in all ways, not just the cryptography) that it ended up taking over the entire market, displacing the non-secure options.
People should be building the next ssh, not the next PGP.
- lsc 14y ago>People should be building the next ssh, not the next PGP. Yeah. I'd like something that simple and secure (where users can use the same private key across sites) for web browsers. X509 client authentication, as far as I can tell, doesn't cut the mustard. Among other problems, it requires trusted certificate authorities, which causes... problems.
- rdl 14y agothere are good reasons to want a unique key per site (avoiding linking across sites), and most of the problems with x509 (aside from it just being lame) are due to UI/UX in browsers, especially legacy desktop browsers, and lack of good support elsewhere. You could even get away without CAs (or where site = CA) for the client cert problem, too. It's really not an open crypto research problem; it's design and software engineering and entrepreneurship/marketing.