3 ms·
I completely agree it depends upon your threat model. But I find the term 'threat model' isn't that useful when a simpler answer is possible. The term is great
by marshray 14y ago
I completely agree it depends upon your threat model. But I find the term 'threat model' isn't that useful when a simpler answer is possible. The term is great for leading you to ask more questions.
One huge advantage of the paper system is people have thousands of years of collective experience dealing with the security of paper documents. For example, the 4th Amendment to the US Constitution reads "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, ... shall not be violated...".
The question "is it safe on my desk next to my computer?" illustrates how users tend to discount their own experience and common sense once computer security gets involved. This is certainly reasonable from the users' perspective. We've all had absurdly counterintuitive experiences with computers, heard astonishing stories about hackers, and gotten plenty of nonsensical advice from the 'experts'.
- dredmorbius 14y agoI find the term 'threat model' isn't that useful It's domain-specific language. It is a model. Of your threat profile. Of risks, exposures, etc. Understand the concept, it's useful. One huge advantage of the paper system ... Paper has many advantages. I own a great deal of paper. I love paper. It's tremendously stable. It's also hard to search, expensive to duplicate, and carries a risk of single-copy loss. Even misplacing (without destroying) a document can be a crisis. Those are all parts of the paper threat model. Your mention of the fourth amendment brings up s great many other issues, and I won't discuss them, but generally pointing in the direction of: Are electronic records "papers", and in what contexts and locations are they treated as such. Do protections against unreasonable search protect against warrented searches? Or warrantless searches? As for practical experience: I've had some in the areas of which I write here.