6 ms·
Break SHA256, and you can cause hash collisions that allows you to easily mine blocks until 51% of the network switches to a better hashing algorithm (which sho
by nadaviv 13y ago
Break SHA256, and you can cause hash collisions that allows you to easily mine blocks until 51% of the network switches to a better hashing algorithm (which should happen pretty quick, because it'll be obvious that someone broke it). To steal users money, you'd have to break ECDSA.
Edit: I wasn't 100% exact. It gives you more [1] than easily mining blocks, but still not that much power so that I would call it "Winning".
[1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Weaknesses#Attacker_has_a_lot_of_computing_power https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Weaknesses#Attacker_has_a_lot_of_...
- tptacek 13y agoAnd you're more confident in ECDSA why?
- betterunix 13y agoCompute hashes faster than the rest of the network and you win. The "51% attack" is a polynomial time attack, which is not an acceptable security margin in cryptography.
- reedlaw 13y agoIt seems the "51% attack" can be mitigated simply by waiting for 6 or more confirmations before sending off merchandise or in the case of an exchange, allowing withdrawal of funds. Those who can't wait that long can rely on 3rd parties who attempt to take on fraud in exchange for transaction fees, similar to the current credit card system.
- betterunix 13y agoThat is not true. The attack works regardless of how many confirmations you wait for.
- reedlaw 13y agoHow so? Isn't a double spend only possible if the attacker's blockchain fork endures for the customary 6 blocks it takes to confirm a transaction? A single block fork would be ignored by the majority chain and thus the attacker's chain transactions would be useless.
- doublec 13y agoIt doesn't matter how many confirmations you wait for if the attacker has >=51%. The attack looks like this: 1) Attacker starts mining a fork offline (ie. doesn't publish blocks) 2) Attacker sends payment to merchant but does not include payment in fork in (1) 3) Attacker waits 6 confirmations then receives goods. 4) Attacker double spends the money in the fork (1). 5) Attacker releases fork when it is longer than the main chain. If they have greater than 51% they will always be able to do (5) because at some point they'll be longer than the main chain. It doesn't matter how many confirmations the merchant waits for.