Well, this is a mighty difficult discussion to have in little HN boxes. I guess I can see what Dennett is getting at from your summary, but I've read other phil

Well, this is a mighty difficult discussion to have in little HN boxes. I guess I can see what Dennett is getting at from your summary, but I've read other philosophers who would just argue instead that qualia are wholly representational. But not even all representationalists agree that qualia are wholly representational. Some of them, known as "externalists" (last I checked) believe, for instance, that the qualia of redness that you feel when you look at a ripe tomato--that feeling that feels irreducible--is actually the property of redness that the tomato itself has. That position seems completely nutty to me, but I guess one often becomes a famous philosopher for making nutty but interesting arguments. The last time I studied philosophy seriously, the typical wording to deny dualism would be to assert that "there is no explanatory gap" or "no 'hard' problem of consciousness". As for the different senses of qualia, when last I was studying philosophy, the primary sense of "qualia" used was that of phenomenal qualia. Sometimes other senses would be discussed, but I don't recall seeing many clear and compelling arguments being made based on these distinctions. Most of the debate at the time seemed to center around The Knowledge Argument.