"Philosophical Zombies are not falsifiable, as they are necessarily completely indistinguishable from conscious beings in any way we could test or measure." Yo

"Philosophical Zombies are not falsifiable, as they are necessarily completely indistinguishable from conscious beings in any way we could test or measure." You might impose an additional criteria such as complexity limits as I suggested, which could lead you to a definition of concuousness as a near minimal encoding of "human like" responses. And would of course be falsifiable. But you can take it in the other direction for example someone who is completely paralysed, they might be conscious but we'd have no way of knowing. That could bring into play the idea that the ability to interact with the rest of the universe is an integral part of concuousness. The problem is that to most people consciousness is defined by its purely subjective experience. Mind from matter people would possibly say that subjective experience is an illusion. Searle's thought experiments highlight that fact, which is what makes them useful, because they make the division between the two camps clear.