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Disclaimer: I've never been a fan of storing my data on someone else's hard drives, but many others seem to think it's a good idea. At any rate, how is this mo

by howeyc 13y ago

Disclaimer: I've never been a fan of storing my data on someone else's hard drives, but many others seem to think it's a good idea. At any rate, how is this more secure? Amazon has physical access to S3 servers, and physical access to these new HSM things. So what exactly is the benefit? Is this just so companies can meet some security compliance regulations while keeping all their data Amazon's hard drives?

jeremyjh 13y ago
The entire point of HSM is that physical access does not compromise your keys. The keys are not stored on a disk, and if someone tries to pry it open, it will erase its memory. Check out their FAQ: http://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/faqs/ http://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/faqs/
- MichaelGG 13y ago
  Extremely interesting paper on reverse engineering the Luna CA3, which is the same vendor Amazon is using: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/Chrysalis.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/Chrysalis.pdf Edit: And the final report: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-592.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-592.pdf Which says it took 7 months to do the reversing.
cameronh90 13y ago
Their primary feature is tamper-resistant key management. It means you can store your keys in a data centre - where people you don't fully trust may have physical hardware access - yet still have an expectation of security. Something like this is useful whether you use Amazon or a traditional data center.
petcat 13y ago
Yeah it's just compliance. But Amazon having physical access doesn't matter because this level of CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) is enforced by Amazon also, by contract.
- count 13y ago
  It's also been tested for technical enforcement - the Luna SA stuff is FIPS certified.
- marshray 13y ago
  Contracts are only a substitute for physical or cryptographic security when you're not the one with the most to lose from a successful compromise.
- edwintorok 13y ago
  How can you know that your instance is talking to the real CloudHSM and not a software emulation that can reveal the keys? At some point Amazon might be forced (by some wiretapping lawys, or subpoena) to fake the HSM presented to your instances and give others access to your keys. Of course the attack window is considerably reduced, if they want to perform this attack they have to do it when you initially set up the CloudHSM, they can't replace it later with a fake HSM, but still...
  - rdl 13y ago
    Generally HSMs have manufacturer keys, too, so you'd need to compromise both Amazon and SafeNet (admittedly, both US companies which could be subject to court order...). The weak point is initial provisioning, as you point out.
    - rdl 13y ago
      Fuck, sadly I just talked to safenet at their booth at aws and they don't do this, so you are totally vulnerable to giving keys to a fake hsm, essentially making cloud hsm useless. Unless their booth dudes were misinformed.

by howeyc 13y ago

jeremyjh 13y ago

The entire point of HSM is that physical access does not compromise your keys. The keys are not stored on a disk, and if someone tries to pry it open, it will erase its memory. Check out their FAQ: http://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/faqs/ http://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/faqs/

MichaelGG 13y ago
Extremely interesting paper on reverse engineering the Luna CA3, which is the same vendor Amazon is using: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/Chrysalis.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/Chrysalis.pdf Edit: And the final report: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-592.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-592.pdf Which says it took 7 months to do the reversing.

cameronh90 13y ago

Their primary feature is tamper-resistant key management. It means you can store your keys in a data centre - where people you don't fully trust may have physical hardware access - yet still have an expectation of security. Something like this is useful whether you use Amazon or a traditional data center.

petcat 13y ago

Yeah it's just compliance. But Amazon having physical access doesn't matter because this level of CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) is enforced by Amazon also, by contract.

count 13y ago
It's also been tested for technical enforcement - the Luna SA stuff is FIPS certified.
marshray 13y ago
Contracts are only a substitute for physical or cryptographic security when you're not the one with the most to lose from a successful compromise.
edwintorok 13y ago
How can you know that your instance is talking to the real CloudHSM and not a software emulation that can reveal the keys? At some point Amazon might be forced (by some wiretapping lawys, or subpoena) to fake the HSM presented to your instances and give others access to your keys. Of course the attack window is considerably reduced, if they want to perform this attack they have to do it when you initially set up the CloudHSM, they can't replace it later with a fake HSM, but still...
- rdl 13y ago
  Generally HSMs have manufacturer keys, too, so you'd need to compromise both Amazon and SafeNet (admittedly, both US companies which could be subject to court order...). The weak point is initial provisioning, as you point out.
  - rdl 13y ago
    Fuck, sadly I just talked to safenet at their booth at aws and they don't do this, so you are totally vulnerable to giving keys to a fake hsm, essentially making cloud hsm useless. Unless their booth dudes were misinformed.